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1.0. SUMMARY
1.1. Background and Reasons for Study
Background
The Satellite Power System (SPS) was originally proposed by Peter
Glaser in 1968 and has been under increasingly intensive study by the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) since 1971 and by the Department
of Energy (DOE) and its predecessor since 1976. The original design concepts
have been largely preserved in the current Reference System (1) while the
understanding of requirements and characteristics has increased significantly.
Because of the promise of providing base-load power from the sun, and without
major continuing fossil fuel needs, the SPS concept is being actively invest-
igated to determine its technical, economic, environmental, and social
requirements and their impacts to determine if commitment of substantial
resources should be recommended.
One of the criteria which will be used to judge the SPS is its costs
and certainty of those costs in relation to other methods of basel oad power
generation.
This study concentrdtes o_ the certainty and accuracy of the costs in
one major sub-area of the SPS: those of the space _rd._v,_*_"_,v., system
necessarily associated with lifting the Space Power System components and
assembly equipment to Low Earth Orbit " _IL u) and to its ultimate location in
Geosynchronous Equatorial Orbit (GEO). A description of the Reference SPS
Concept and its associated transport requirements are located in Appendix A.
The costs of these systems, their current status and level of certainty and
their comparison with likely future energy alternatives have accordingly been
planned as part of the Concept Development and Evaluation Program under-
taken jointly by DOE and NASA. Through two aerospace contractors, Boeing and
Rockwell, the concepts proposed by Glaser and expanded by others were in-
vestigated and reduced to specific design and implementation proposals. The
engineering investigation for those designs enabled a variety of technology
needs and environmental interactions or effects to be specified in sufficient
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detail to permit approximate descriptions of the progress needed in all areas
to implement the SPS concept. These studies also permitted specification of
the approximate costs associated with each major subsystem of the SPS to the
extent that major cost drivers could be identified. While major cost concerns
exist in all areas, the two major cost drivers identified are the solar cell
production cost and the recurring cost of space transportation. This study
reviews all space transportation costs to determine their accuracy and
certainty.
The reason for this study is to provide an overview of the costs in
one of the major SPS subsystems, as part of a series of similar studies to
determine whether there have been any omissions in costs categories, whether
reasonable procedures have been followed, and to estimate the uncertainties in
the costs as given in the various estimates from the design contractors and
assessments from NASA.
These estimates have been found, in general, to be reasonably based
on assumptions made by the design contractors and NASA/Johnson Space Center.
However, several of these are subject to challenge. Accordingly, cost
uncertainties are investigated in the form of sensitivity analyses. That is,
alternative cost calculations are made based on varying these assumptions over
ranges believed to be reasonable.
1.2 Objective and Approach
The objective of this study is to provide a clear picture of SPS
space transportation costs at the present time with respect to their accuracy
as stated, the reasonableness of the methods used, the assumptions made, and
the uncertainty associated with the estimates. The approach used consists of
examining space transportation costs from several perspectives--to perform a
variety of sensitivity analyses or reviews and examine the findings in terms
of internal consistency and external comparison with analogous systems.
These approaches are summarized as a theoretical and historical
review including a review of stated and unstated assumptions used to derive
the costs, and a performance or technical review. These reviews cover the
overall transportation program as well as the individual vehicles proposed.
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The review of overall cost assumptions is the principal meansused for
estimating the cost uncertainty derived as a conclusion in this report. The
cost estimates used as the best current estimate are contained in Reference 2,
and reproduced as Appendix B.
1.2.1 Theoretical and Historical Review
Estimatin 9 Methods: There are two fundamental approaches in deriving
cost estimates for complex systems such as the SPS: The bottom-up method in
which every component is priced through catalogs and labor factors and the
top-down method in which major systems are priced by comparison to analogous
equipment with extrapolation to the requisite capability. The bottom-up
method is typically applied to projects where experience in building similar
equipment provides a base for selecting appropriate reserves and accordingly
has typical uncertainty of _ 5 percent in comparison with profit goals of 10
to 20 percent. The top-down method is usually applied in aerospace projects
where new capabilities are sought and typically has an uncertainty in the
range of _ 10 percent to _ 15 percent. This stated uncertainty implicitly
applies to the next generation of equipment and where capabilities improve-
ments are typically increased by a factor of two or less.
The SPS transport equipm_i_t _v_'^'+A:fimates__....... are fundamentally derived
by analogy to historical cost and technical parameters and then extrapolated
to the requirements of the SPS. These requirements are well beyond the range
of current operating experience in size of _,u_.__._+.. .+"_o_ frnm the standpoint of
reusing chemical propulsion launch vehicles, and any major experience with
electric propulsion vehicles. The uncertainties in the costs to develop,
produce and operate the space transport vehicles are accordingly large.
Historical analogy indicates, but does not prove, that the growth in
payload capability needed by the SPS and the level of uncertainty can be
significantly reduced by appropriate technology demonstrations. These tech-
nology demonstrations will provide the building blocks and engineering
information which will permit capability growth. One of these, the Space
Shuttle, is nearing early operational capability. Work on photovoltaic cells
is being actively pursued by many organizations. Other activities such as
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developments in space structures and electrical propulsion are in early
developmentstages with more activity planned. With anticipated technological
progress in these areas over the next decade, the groundwork needed to develop
the SPSvehicles should be in place to permit practical design and construc-
tion. Otherwise, uncertainty is not reduced and the uncertainty in costs will
be at ]east that of the methodology. The likelihood of having additional
expenditures to achieve needed capabilities in the design or development phase
of the vehicles would be greatly increased.
Accordingly, the method used to estimate uncertainty in SPSvehicle
developmentand initial production costs is to indicate the type and size of
program neededto achieve the recurring cost goals if the initial develop-
ment proves unsatisfactory in meeting goals of reusability or operating re-
quirements. The existence of demonstrated basic technology at the time of
commitmentto system development effort is considered a prerequisite to our
estimates. This method is chosen over a detailed review of the two aerospace
contractors' estimating procedure for several reasons:
(1) The basic equipment costs were derived by two different aero-
space contractors (Boeing and Rockwell) from two nominally
separate data bases. The agreement between the two estimates is
considered good whenallowances are madefor differences in
equipment proposed and for the inherently imprecise results of
this methodology.
(2) In the areas of the Electric Orbital Transfer Vehicle (EOTV),
structures, engine reusability, reusable reentry thermal
protection systems and refurbishment/maintenance of vehicles
(both on the ground and in space), no operating experience
exists. Manyof the applicable Space Shuttle estimates
implicitly and explicity used are also being questioned although
it is expected that reasonable extensions of current efforts
will yield success.
(3) The detailed estimating relationships used by Boeing are based
on companyexperience primarily in aircraft and secondly in
spacecraft and launch vehicle stage construction and are highly
proprietary. Our request for 'information in this area was
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denied. In view of the great extrapolation required to achieve
SPScapabilities, it was not considered worthwhile to pursue a
detailed investigation of the Rockwell estimating methods (which
used a NASAdata base) whenthe Boeing designs were selected as
the Reference System vehicles. The Boeing designs are con-
sidered to be less technically ambitious than the Rockwell
designs.
(4) The performance and programmatic assumptions madeto derive SPS
transportation costs have uncertainties affecting operating
costs which are believed to be more significant at this time
than projection errors from historical data.
The conclusions drawn from the examinations made in the program
indicate, moreover, that if the proposed Reference Vehicles are used, and the
requisite technologies for the SPSand SPSvehicles are pursued with the
diligence needed to makethe concept valid, the basic cost estimates for the
vehicles are reasonable.
Historical Comparison: The historical comparisons we made indicate
that the development and operating costs projected for the SPS are reasonable
from the standpoint that they reflect the costs experienced in past major
p_-ograms. Historically, real costs of conducting operations are reduced _s
technology progresses in a given area, but this progress does r_ot continue
indefinitely. Costs tend to level out as a specific technology matures and
further cost reduction requires new technology. Space trans_rtation shows no
sign of approaching theoretical physical limits on cost reduction for reusable
vehicles while the expendable concepts appear to have reached a plateau.
Because selecting analogies for quantitative projections is conjectural and
subject to challenge, we do not use historical projection methods for purposes
other than to confirm that the estimated unit costs represent reasonable
projections for twenty years in the future. The central question is whether
15 or 25 years will be needed to achieve them, and the level of research and
development required in the interim.
Optimization: The SPS space transportation system has not been
subjected to a formal optimization analysis in the sense that each vehicle and
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the entire system design is backed by explicit calculations showing that
variations in capabilities would cost more than those of the current proposed
designs. Most efforts in this direction are based on exclusion of designs
that clearly cost more. Oneexample is the selection of the Electric Orbit
Transfer Vehicle for cargo transport. The requirement to lift fuels to orbit
to propel chemical cargo transfer vehicles clearly make an electric propulsion
vehicle desirable because of its mass efficiency. So little is known about
the requirements for electric vehicles that considering minor variations on
the payload and hence the overall size is inappropriate. In the case of the
Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle, however, it is likely that optimization studies can
produce conclusive results. A study by R. H. Miller(4) indicates that the
HLLV design as proposed for the SPS program occupies a region in parameter
space where costs do not vary significantly with vehicle size. This is
consistent with our understanding that NASA and its contractors considered
HLLVs with weights of twice and half that of the currently proposed HLLV with
only modest overall changes in total program costs. On the basis that devel-
opment costs are approximately proportional to vehicle weight, it is likely
that smaller HLLV designs can reduce front-end costs with increases in recur-
ring use costs but only modest increases in total program costs. The advan-
tages of extensive reuse of vehicles without significant refurbishment between
flig'nts are so great, however, that significant investments in reusability (as
contrasted with refurbishability) would, if successful, provide a greater
reduction in total program costs than any program which extends shuttle-
equivalent technology depending on refurbishment and expendable items such as
external tanks. Since reusability via-a-vis the airlines is not now available
and represents an area of high uncertainty in any case, proposals in this area
by Rockwell were not selected for the Reference Design. The Personnel Launch
Vehicle presents another problem. While the concept of a light cargo and
personnel vehicle is considered to have validity, no mission other than
personnel transport has been identified. This mission could also be accom-
plished by a personnel module aboard the HLLV with a savings in both devel-
opment and recurring cost. Thus, unless the HLLV is unacceptable for some
reason, such as safety, the PLV does not have a strong justification at this
time. Adaptation of the then-existing Shuttle capability without a major
development chargeable to the SPS program appears to be a reasonable path.
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Since the major purpose of this study is to evaluate the cost
estimates of the given Reference Design, the analyses do not undertake
extensive assessmentsof designs whosecosts are even more uncertain than
those available. The question of optimization of the space transportation
capabilities and costs is unresolved and this investigation is limited to
commentingon available results and potential opportunities to achieve
improvements.
1.2.2 Performance Revi ew
The performance review undertaken in this investigation considers
performance to reflect all technical aspects of the proposed Reference Design
and some of the alternatives. The reviews reflect knowledge of the diffi-
culties and problem areas for current operations and planned space activities
within the next decade. The growth in vehicle size, capabilities, and
reusability envisioned for the SPS has many unresolved and probably unde-
termined problems. We do not purport that our investigation has uncovered all
of them.
The performance of the specific designs was checked using standard
performance evaluation programs and the performance claims made were found to
be accurate. The improvements in capabilities required to achieve the
performance goals are considered to be reasondble given the time and funding
projected for their development. Our major concern with the costs projec-
ted on the basis of the stated designs is that they assume 100 percent
reliability. There are no reserves other than a very minor allowance for
below-nominal performance of all engines. Furthermore, no provision has been
made for such contingencies as engine trouble which can require the shut-down
of one or more of the 30 engines on the HLLV.
We believe that any system will be required to have safety and
operating margins which anticipate all major and most minor incidents or
accidents. Accordingly we can infer potential cost changes from our
perception of safety and operating margin requirements. These changes affect
both development and operating costs and there are only limited opportunities
to trade development and/or investment costs for operating savings. Our
evaluation in the performance area consists of three main activities:
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(1) Comparison of transportation vehicle weights with present
systems and designs to determine whether or not the projected
weights can reasonably be achieved
(2) Identification and assessment of the level of technology
required for the major vehicle hardware elements (e.g. rocket
engines)
(3) Analysis of vehicle mission performance to verify that the
vehicles defined by the contractors would produce the results
cl aimed.
These results, and consideration of deviations therefrom, are then
used to determine cost impacts and uncertainties.
1.2.3 Review of Overall Transportation Assumptions:
The current SPS transportation plan is based on a variety of
assumptions which were made to permit a fixed and specific cost estimate for
the SPS program. These assumptions range from 100 percent vehicle reliability
and the use of the same launch vehicle technology over thirty years to the
stated program goal of sixty SPS satellites with a production rate of exactly
two per year over thirty years. These assumptions are considered to be the
major cause of cost uncertainty in both the overall SPS program and the space
transport costs. The cost estimates for specific developments have been made
using an accepted methodology and are large in comparison to most other human
activities. We have also examined the overall SPS program development and
implementation scenarios to determine their reasonableness. The approach used
is to examine both the overall plan and its specific assumptions, both stated
and unstated, to determine elements in the scenario which are, in our opinion,
unduly optimistic. The reference designs are themselves moderately
conservative estimates of technical capability 20 years in the future and are
thus the major component of pessimism found. Specific areas of optimism are
then assessed to determine what alternative assumptions are considered more
realistic. The cost impact of these new assumptions is then estimated using
uncomplicated techniques and, as necessary, our own simplifying assumptions.
We did not select unduly pessimistic or worst case assumptions for two
reasons :
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(1) Significant development is required for SPS and the cost
estimates reflect this. We expect that most of the presently perceived
problems will be resolved by the year 2000. (2) It is all too easy to make
assumptions based on current knowledge which show that a future system will
not work or will have enormous costs. These pessimistic assumptions
frequently have little more basis than optimistic assumptions and frequently
fail to recognize the potential magnitude of technical progress that is likely
over a period of two decades or more.
One assumption has been found, however, which we feel is overly
optimistic. This is the assumption that vehicle development requirements will
end by the time of the first SPS. Vehicle developments and improvements are a
continuing process and can be expected to take place throughout the SPS pro-
gram. These will be a source of improvements leading to progressively more
cost-efficient vehicles during the proposed thirty-year SPS construction
cycle. The cost implications of this type of vehicle improvement have not
been addressed in the SPS plans to date because of the difficulty in project-
ing these types of costs (and their benefits) into the distant future.
Because the costs (and benefits) are diffuse and these improvements will also
benefit other programs, no penalty has been assessed to the SPS program cost
estimates.
1.2.4 "^"_ .......
_:,,ew of Tnaividual Vehicle Cost Assumptions
The cost estimates for individual vehicles were also investigated
and assessed for realism in terms of self-consistency, relation to current and
historical experience and technological development requirements. This
assessment is then related to cost uncertainties, especially for recurring
costs. The vehicle cost and performance estimates were point estimates and did
not contain any significant allowances for less than 100 percent of stated
capabilities. Our approach for assessing cost uncertainty is acknowledged to
be somewhat simplistic in that uncertainties in the individual vehicles are
not independent and, hence, are not strictly additive or cumulative. Thus,
the comments on individual vehicles should be used as an indication that
further work is required to determine capabilities, requirements, and costs,
rather than an assumption that a specific design element or its implication
has a direct and unavoidable impact on costs.
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1.3 SPS Transportation Costs Review
Conclusions and Recommendations
1.3.1 General Conclusions About SPS Space Transportation Plans
The costs determined by NASA and its contractors for the SPS space
transportation requirements are believed to be reasonable early program esti-
mates if some adjustments for optimistic development and operations scenarios
are made. The uncertainty in these estimates is high and not easily quantifi-
able because there are technology development areas (e.g. large space struc-
tures) where no experience exists.
The cost estimates NASA directly associates with space transportation
(Reference 2) do not explicitly include items such as the launch facilities
and intra-orbital transfer vehicles (IOTV's) as the Work Breakdown Structure
(WBS) (Reference 4) used assigns these items to other categories than to space
transport. The launch facilities, for example, support the SPS platforms and
the IOTV's are also used for space construction. Cost estimates for these
items have been made and are included in the overall program. These estimates
appear adequate under the assumptions made for the SPS deployment scenario and
are briefly reviewed as part of this study. The major assumption with a cost
impact on space transportation is that the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) will be
adequate for launching the Reference Design's 5-Gigawatt SPS platforms and
associated equipment at a rate of two per year. Existing international air-
ports such as Los Angeles transfer approximately this mass (or more) at the
present time so it is likely that KSC will be adequate. If not, another
launch site will be required with an additional cost of $2 billion to $6
billion depending upon where and how the center is located. An equatorial
land site, if available, would tend toward the lower estimate (for construc-
tion only) and a sea-floor site would tend toward the higher estimate.
Specialized SPS facilities are not included in these estimates.
The cost estimates and initial designs used to make these estimates
reflect early program information and are usually considered not to be the
type of information upon which a firm commitment to a go/no go decision can be
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made unless additional information confirms this judgement. Rather, these
estimates and designs may indicate, from the standpoint of space transporta-
tion, whether the SPS concept may be cost competitive with other sources of
power; but the uncertainties may be too large to make this judgement based on
the stated program costs. Similarly these stated costs do not permit
rejection of the current SPS concept.
There is a tradeoff between recurring cost per flight, development
expenditure and the certainty of estimates in capabilities and costs. If the
goal is low and certain capabilities and costs for recurring space transporta-
tion operations, the development costs to achieve those capabilities cannot be
subjected to rigid limitations or single-line development programs. The
possibility of development failures must be anticipated and some alternative
subsystem concepts must be carried along, until success is demonstrated. This
type of effort requires a higher and more uncertain level of program costs at
a time when the program is not producing direct economic benefits. The
development and deployment scenarios used in deriving the transportation cost
estimates basically assume that the program does not carry any unresolved
development problems forward to the time of initial deployment. Because
research results are not deterministic, the development cost uncertainty is
high even for the current designs which are based, with some significant
exceptions, on currently available technology. Paying the price to assure
reli -_1_au,=and reusab!__ vehicles must be done at some time as the space
transportation costs themselves are a major cost driver of the SPS program.
We also have a related concern that a program defined for thirty
years is based on use of the same vehicle designs to haul equipment of the
same design over the entire period. If the concepts prove viable, it is
expected that the designs will be modified to take advantage of improvements
in technology. The use of a personnel vehicle directly related to the current
shuttle design (PLV) twenty to fifty years in the future is also considered
questionable on the samebasis. This aspect of the program has already been
recognized and alternatives such as a personnel module aboard the HLLV will
receive future consideration if only because the quoted recurring cost per
flight is the same while the payloads have a mass ratio of almost 5 to I.
This concern does not, however, reflect directly upon the question of accuracy
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and certainty of the cost estimates for space transport for the given
Reference Design which do not contain any allowance for development problems
discovered during SPS operations. Advances in vehicle technology leading to
later efficiencies similarly have not been proposed.
The fact that the space transportation costs are a major cost driver
of the SPS program is leading to a significant program of technology develop-
ment and possible reexamination of alternatives. These alternative designs,
such as Rockwell's aerospace plane, were not selected for the SPS Reference
Design because of their additional technology requirements. If these concepts
are admitted, the technology, development and test costs can lead to an
expenditure level significantly higher than currently estimated ($17 billion)
through the first operational SPS. This level can easily be a factor of two
($34 billion) but, like the current estimate, it would be spread out over 15
to 20 years. From this level of effort, recurring costs for transportation
can be expected to be at and probably significantly below the current re-
curring estimates. The recurring cost reduction would come from the improved
ability to reuse vehicles as contrasted with the Shuttle where significant
refurbishment and replacement is associated with each flight. This approach
will, however, require an early national policy commitment to increase the
level of launch vehicle and related development effort. We do not, therefore,
direct our examination of the transportation cost estimates toward areas
requiring major expenditure increases.
1.3.2 Conclusions About the Reference System
The SPS transportation costs have been derived using an appropriate
methodology, specifically the top-down or extrapolation technique which
typically has an uncertainty of +_ 15 percent when applied to programs under-
taken in the immediate future. The SPS program will be using technology to be
developed over the next ten years and the uncertainty in specific areas is
therefore higher. Specific areas of uncertainty are discussed in sections
covering each vehicle.
If the technology and development programs are funded at a reasonable
level and problems resolved as uncovered over the next 15 to 20 years it is
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considered likely that the goals for recurring costs can be met with the
development and investment expenditures at or only moderately above current
estimates. For the vehicles specified, the potential increases are
considered to be in the range of 15 to 50 percent resulting in a potential
increase of the current estimate of $17 billion for DDT&E to $20 billion to
$26 billion. The 15 percent figure reflects a limit based on the uncertainty
of the methodology and the upper limit of 50 percent reflects cost growth
experience in some large, technologically ambitious military programs. A
formal calculation estimates the uncertainty at -15 percent to +25 percent.
The recurring transportation costs are based on an ambitious scenario
with an early initial operating capability and an assumption of 100 percent
vehicle reliability. While adequate allowances have been made for cargo
breakage (2 percent) and for payload packaging and palleting (15 percent), no
provision was made for either partial failures, such as an engine-out condi-
tion or for complete failures resulting in loss of a vehicle. The cost
uncertainty associated with the estimating methodology is typically a +_ 15
percent band around the stated estimate. Further, a minimum of 10 percent
reserve in transportation requirements is recommended at this time to permit
adequate safety margins. Accordingly a growth of up to 25 percent is possible
for recurring HLLV transportation costs. This growth, if fully realized,
would result in an increase in _^_,,=cur_nt,_......_timate of HLLV costs, for
example, of $2.8 billion per SPS to $3.5 billion. For the current program of
2 SPS sateiiites per year this is a growth from $5.6 billion per year to $7.0
billion per year. Major areas identified for efforts to control costs are the
entire Electric Orbit Transfer Vehicle (EOTV) and the refurbishment/
reusability efforts for the Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle. The uncertainty in
costs is especially high in these areas because no operating experience
exists. An especially sensitive case is the EOTV and this is discussed in
section 1.3.4. Because of this uncertainty, it is not possible to state that
cost growth is inevitable and, accordingly, the potential range of growth in
costs should be used only as a guide in determining SPS program sensitivity to
transportation costs in comparison with alternate power sources.
Associated with the transportation vehicles are facilities and
personnel who will build and operate the vehicles and SPS platforms. These
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will be located on the ground and at two locations in space. There is
significant ground experience in operating a spaceport, but most of this
applies only to operations with expendable vehicles. The Skylab experience is
the only effort where equipment was extensively planned for reuse. Consider-
ing that the initial launch had a partial failure, the experience of
recovering from that failure strongly suggests that the SPS can succeed in
handling most contingencies. The uncertainties in costs for operations with
orders of magnitude increase in complexity are, however, very great. The
uncertainty used in judging the orbital facilities and operations costs can
only be that assigned to the SPS platforms and their operations. The avail-
able information on ground staffing plans for transport, however, appears
adequate under the reusability assumptions made explicitly and the implicit
assumption that the SPS space activities are imbedded in an active NASA space
program and do not have to carry the additional burden of being the only space
program. They are tight, but credible.
The conclusions about uncertainty in SPS Transporation costs is
summarized in a quantitative table covering both the vehicles and the
transportation plan in Section 1.3.8 after the individual vehicles are
rev i ewed.
1.3.3 Heav_ Lift Launch Vehic]e(HLLV) Conclusions
The HLLV design and use scenario have reserves for cargo packaging
and breakage totaling 17 percent, and these appear reasonable. However, no
provision has been made for less than I00 percent reliability in planned
launches, whether for minor incidents which could require the shut-down of one
or two of the HLLV's thirty engines or total loss of a vehicle. Based on
assumed reliabilities of 0.99 to 0.9999 for individual engines, at least one
engine would not perform adequately for 26 percent to 0.3 percent of the
trips. With a payload reduction of approximately I0 percent, the desired
orbit can be achieved if one engine on each stage fails. Further, the excess
propellants for the successful trips can be transferred to orbital storage for
use with POTV and intra-orbital vehicles, and for breathing and electrical
power usage. Space propellant storage and refrigerators will be required but
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are not discussed from the standpoint of costs, as storage is viewed as part
of the orbital construction facilities.
Since there is a rough mass balance between a 10 percent payload mass
reserve for safety and propellant and oxygen consumption for orbital transfer
and consumables requirements this specific safety factor may not result in any
significant cost growth. This balance has not been investigated in detail and
will require additional technical effort to understand all the implications.
Other factors such as supply requirements not forseeable at this time
and weight growth in SPS satellites or orbital maintenance equipment suggest,
but do not demonstrate, a need for a payload growth allowance of at least 10
percent. The technology development requirements for the HLLV are not so
stringent that a major performance deficit is to be expected, but this 10
percent allowance can also be viewed as a hedge that would permit slight
growth in vehicle weight or slight reduction in engine performance if
development does not proceed exactly as planned. An alternative lower limit
on unforseen needs, equally valid, is that additional consumables can be
accommodated by one additional HLLV Launch per year.
A major cost driver is the labor and time needed for replenishing the
HLLV for each flight and for replacement or refurbishment of components upon
wear-out or damage. There is no operational experience with reusable vehicles
and estimates made for _h_,,_shu_tlo,_.._ .....h_v_not been confirmed. Thus, these costs
estimates are not subject to either confirmation or refutation on the basis of
current u....._o_.o Fnr the HLLV the costs per flight can be categorized as:
Vehicle Wear out (over 300 flights) 19.6%
Other capital costs (Tooling) 2.3%
Fuel 15.2%
Repl eni shment/Refurbi shment and
other Manpower 62.9%
100.0%
[Calculated from
Reference 2 which
is reproduced as
Appendix B]
Thus uncertainties in replenishment/refurbishment, almost all of which are
manpower costs, are the major source of uncertainty in the average cost per
flight. Deviations from expected costs would change the average cost per
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flight proportionally. The cost risk to the program is, however, subject to a
great degree of control through a development program which concentrates on
the costs to fly the vehicle. The learning associated with the shuttle will
also reduce the lack of knowledge in this area. Accordingly, an adjustment to
the estimates is not recommendedat this time.
The HLLVfleet size, initially 6, is considered to be too small when
factors such as potential delays and the possibility of an accident are
considered. The average launch rate is 1.2 per day and the stated turnaround
time is 5 1/2 days. The average life is 300 flights and the equivalent
production rate (including refurbishment) is 3 per year based on an equivalent
of 94 vehicles over the 30-year program. The program will enter an initial
build-up phase where learning can take place and the delay in availability of
one of the six vehicles is unlikely to be critical to program progress. When
actual construction of a power satellite is underway, any delay must be
recovered as soon as possible. If a vehicle is out of service for any reason,
whether by a serious accident, a launch hold, or by a weather delay, multiple
launches will be required each day until the payloads for the scheduled EOTV
are delivered. This will require the availability of reserve vehicles and
payloads. Thesemay, in fact, be vehicles which would be launched in the next
few days. Based on a 300-flight life and 94 equivalent vehicles, there is a
reserve in equivalent vehicles whenrefurbishment is considered, but we are
concerned that sufficient physical vehicles maynot be available for these
multiple flight situations because of the 5-1/2-day turnaround time. The
average unit cost for additional reserve HLLVsis $595 million and the
addition of each reserve HLLVis a 1.8 percent increment to the nominal DDT&
E and Investment (front-end transportation cost) of $33 billion. The addition
of reserve vehicles is recommendedas they can also be used for other space
programs and whenthe time value of delays in schedule of the SPSsatellites
is considered, it probably can be shownthat that they will pay for themselves
in this manner. The numberof reserve vehicles can be projected based on risk
acceptance assumptions and turnaround times. If a weather delay such as a
week for a hurricane is to be compensatedfor by doubling of the launch rate,
the fleet size must be doubled. This is expensive and may not be justified.
If an airline analogy is used, the appropriate reserve factor is 10 to 15
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percent or 1 or 2 HLLVs. By analogy, this would lead to a 1 percent
cancellation rate due to significant mechanical problems or a 5 percent delay
rate due to minor mechanical problems. Recovery under these rates appears
reasonable. The airline analogy also suggests that approximately 2 percent of
the vehicles will be lost in fatal accidents every 10 years and that 5 percent
of the vehicles will be lost due to both fatal and non-fatal accidents every
10 years. For the 94 vehicle equivalent HLLV's over the 30-year program, it
is likely, then, that two fatal and three non-fatal accidents will occur. One
additional vehicle in reserve at any given time is considered adequate
protection for this contingency.
Because many factors influence reserve requirements, including
explicit statements of willingness to accept or spend to avoid risk for many
differing contingencies, it is difficult to firmly recommend a specific
estimate for reserve HLLV's. The airline analogy of a reserve of one-tenth or
one-fifteenth of the vehicles, but at least one, is recommended for planning
purposes.
The initial fleet size of six also causes a problem in cost certainty
under the methodology used to forecast costs. This initial procurement barely
gets to the knee of the learning curve and thus the costs for this procurement
are subjected to the additional uncertainty, of whether the actual learning
experience will meet the 85 percent learning curve expectation by that time or
some later time, since the assumption of learning at 85 percent can be accu-
rate but realized later. If 90 percent learning is achieved on the first six
vehicles, the cumulative difference is about ten percent of the expenditure on
HLLV's to that point. This is also about 3.5 percent of the initial invest-
ment expenditure of $17 Billion. This level of uncertainty is within the
error band associated with the cost extrapolation methodology.
1.3.4 Electric Orbit Transfer Vehicle IEOTV) Conclusions
The Electric Orbit Transfer Vehicle is the most technically ambitious
of those proposed for the Reference Design. There is no experience with large
structures in space and the estimates of costs for both the SPS power
satellites and EOTV's rest largely on unconfirmed calculations. The ion
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engines, however, have a development history. The major concern with these
engines is achievement of acceptable lifetime in components subject to erosion
by the ions. We conclude that if SPS structure goals can be met, so can those
of the EOTV. The EOTV development cost estimates also reflect this close
association for both structures, power conversion (solar cells), and power
management through cost estimates lower than would otherwise be justified.
The recurring costs also reflect co-production with the SPS of many compo-
nents. The EOTV fleet is projected at 23 to 28 vehicles with a production
rate in orbit of 6 or 8 per year as needed. The flight time to GEO is 180
days and the return time is 40 days. The 23 EOTV's will make 31flights per
year with approximately 60 days allowed for loading, unloading and
refurbishment. This appears tight but probably adequate, except for the
possibility of accidents requiring unscheduled repairs. On the basis of
considerations discussed subsequently, we recommend at least two additional
EOTV's be provided in space with contingency planning for additional ground
storage of EOTV's so that prompt recovery from a severely damaged EOTV can be
achieved. The cost of additional EOTV's is estimated at $284 million, but is
highly uncertain. Achieving this cost goal depends upon meeting production
goals for structures, electrical distribution equipment and solar cells on the
basis of a highly mature and productive industry over a relatively short
period. This is possible, but not subject to proof or disproof in the near
future. The use of silicon photovoltaic cells on the Reference EOTV also
implies rapid degradation of power conversion capacity, up to 40 percent on a
round trip, due to radiation damage. If continuous laser annealing of this
damage, or some other form of rapid annealing, cannot be achieved, significant
cost growth for both investment and recurring costs appears likely. The
importance of annealing the solar cells is so great that we recommend that
Gallium Aluminum Arsenide (GaAIAs) cells, which are expected to be self-
annealing when used with concentrators, should be considered even if silicon
cells are used on the SPS power satellites. Gallium availability in suffi-
cient quantities and at economic cost is not certain at this time, but gallium
in EOTV's would be available for reprocessing and reuse. The apparent advan-
tages of GaAIAs cells vs. Silicon cells in terms of decreasing maintenance and
refurbishment costs are not calculable at this time, and accordingly should be
reexamined later in the SPS program.
!
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Calculations based on previous work with another large area space-
craft, the solar sail(6) indicate that the EOTV will experience a signifi-
cant collision with a satellite (dead or active) with a probability of about
0.1 to 0.3 per round trip. The planned life of an EOTV is ten round trips and
30 to 40 trips are planned each year. Thus, between 3 and 12 significant
collisions can be expected each year. It is expected that collisions with
active satellites can be avoided, but collisions should be a planned contin-
gency. A collision may in fact result in only a slight performance degrada-
tion if power distribution and control functions are redundant. If critical
power elements or major structural members are struck, it is more likely that
a rescue mission will have to be undertaken. This would require an additional
EOTV and/or a special POTV flight with special equipment to repair the EOTV or
to transfer the payload to the new EOTV. Since the Reference SPS Program does
not assume the removal of space debris, the probability of collision for EOTVs
is now higher in LEO than at higher altitudes. It is most likely, therefore,
that collisions will occur below the Van Allen Radiation Belts. These Belts
will probably prevent human participation in vehicle repairs should a colli-
sion occur there. EOTVs not needed for loading should be parked above the
region where collisions are most likely.
All these considerations discussed indicate that the EOTV costs for
development, capital investment and recurring use are uncertain for reasons
which do not, at the present time, permit neat analytical measures of either
uncertainty or cost growth. The costs will likely be higher because early
program estimates tend to be optimistic. Breakthroughs either in technology
or our understanding of reasonable requirements are also possible in the lO to
20 years before commitment to specific designs. These can possibly lead to
reductions which more than make up for underestimation in other areas. The
appropriate direction of effort to reduce costs and their uncertainty can be
determined from the current estimates of costs, given in Table 1.3.1.
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TABLE1.3.1 REFERENCESYSTEMVEHICLECOSTESTIMATES(2)($, MILLIONS)
Theoretical
First Avg. Avg. Per
Vehicle DDT& E % Unit Unit Flight SPS %
HLLV 11,202 66 1,748 595 10.1 1,954 70
EOTV 2,247 13 2,126 284 40.7 575 20
PLV 2,616 15 790 673 10.7 260 9
POTV 1,012 6 100 44 1.3 13 1
17,077 100 2,802 100
Clearly, direction of efforts toward cost reduction and control must
be directed toward the HLLVfirst and the EOTVsecond. The estimated leverage
of the HLLVon total transport cost over that for EOTVis three to five times
as great. Inversely, the uncertainty in EOTVcosts is on the order of three
to five times that of the HLLV. The EOTVdevelopment cost is also strongly
dependent on the success of developments for the SPSsatellite and thus not
subject to great reduction. Thus the goals for the present should be to
reduce costs for the HLLVand reduce uncertainty for the EOTV.
The cost per flight for the EOTVis given by Reference 2 as:
Average Hardware = Average Vehicle Cost = $283.6M = $28.4M (70%)
Flights per Vehicle
Propellants
Refurbishment (including materials and labor and
HLLV Launch costs)
Program Support
Total Cost Per Flight
10
= O.5M (1%)
= 11.3M (28%)
= O.5M (1%)
40.7M
The major potential for cost control for the EOTV then comes from the capital
cost of the vehicle, with a secondary potential from the refurbishment effort.
The ability to reuse and repair the vehicle when damaged is the most signif-
icant area to concentrate effort to control or reduce costs. Based on the
estimates of $10. IM per flight for the HLLV, the recurring effort to reuse and
refurbish and load the EOTV which carries ten HLLV payloads is probably not
subject to significant reduction from the estimate of $11.3M, even if a longer
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lived design proves feasible. The likelihood of replenishment/reloading cost
growth is high and can easily grow by $1 million or more per flight. We
recommend a 10 percent cost allowance ($44.7M cost per flight) to cover
orbital facilities requirements.
There is also concern that learning projected in Reference 2 may not
be achieved on the initial EOTVs. This rate of learning should be thoroughly
investigated and documented in future studies.
The costs for other vehicles have been projected on the basis of a
theoretical first unit (TFU) and a learning (experience) curve of 85 percent.
The EOTV recurring cost for manufacture and assembly, however, has been
projected on the basis of a mature industry approach for many of the compo-
nents including photovoltaic cells, space structure and electrical condi-
tioning and distribution equipment. The existence at an early stage of the
SPS deployment program of such a mature capability in these areas is essential
to the economic attractiveness of the SPS platforms as well as that of the
EOTV. As an example, if the silicon cells are selected for the 5.2 km x
10.4 km platform at a production rate of 2 per year, this implies a production
rate of 72 acres per day, 365 days per year for the SPS platforms alone, in
addition to other space and terrestrial uses. Analogous production capability
is also needed for space structures on an areal basis.
If this capacity is not fully available at the time EOTVs are to be
constructed, the rapid progression from the TFU of $2.126 billion to an aver-
age cost of $283.6 million would not be possible. A possible consequences
would be to place the EOTV on a learning curve in the manner of the other
vehicles. If 70 percent learning is experienced, and this is believed to be
better than is achieved in most aerospace production efforts, the 25th EOTV,
for example, would cost $405 million rather than the $283 million average unit
cost used in many of the Reference System calculations. The initial produc-
tion of 23 EOTVs would then have an initial investment requirement of $16.880
billion (23 vehicles, 70 percent learning, $2.126 billion TFU) rather than the
$8.649 billion determined from the calculation of the TFU plus 22 average
units.
The justification of the use of the average unit cost for the EOTV
then clearly requires more than can be convincingly demonstrated at this early
1-22
stage of investigation. Because this study is expected to provide explicit
estimates of program costs and their uncertainties in a quantitative manner,
we state an explicit uncertainty in a subjective manner for the EOTV. This is
done by noting that if the technology demonstrations supporting the SPS have
been completed before commitment to production, and the technology and its
economics are promising, the manufacturing, production and assembly of the
EOTV components are expected to be a straight-forward set of tasks. Under
these circumstances, the effort to correct production problems is likely to be
accomplished by a relatively low number of billions of dollars than a rela-
tively high number of billions of dollars. Accordingly, we believe, but
cannot prove, that DDT & E and investment requirements will be closer to the
Reference System estimates than to the total of $19 billion indicated by
application of the methodology used for the chemical propulsion vehicles.
Pending further study, we recommend using an estimate of $10 billion for the
initial EOTV investment and increasing the fleet size by three to five vehi-
cles to account for the possibility of vehicle losses. Uncertainty in this
estimate is not reduced by this change and remains very high.
1.3.5 Personnel Launch Vehicle (PLY) Conclusions
The Personnel Launch Vehicle design is an extension of the present
Shuttle design with the addition of a reusable booster as a lower stage. The
development cost for this booster is reasonable in comparison with thedevel-
opment cost of the HLLV only if the development is concurrent. The recurring
cost per flight is estimated at $10.7 million in comparison with an estimate
of $i0.I million for the HLLV. The cargo capacity in tons, however, is 89
tons for the PLV while that for the HLLV is 425 tons (gross). The recurring
cost is considered reasonable, even if it is significantly less than current
estimates for the Shuttle. The reason for this judgement is that the current
Shuttle charge includes program costs which are estimated separately for the
SPS vehicles. These include facility use and general support at the launch
site. This estimate of $10.7 million for the PLV implicitly assumes that the
PLV is part of an ongoing space program for which it is only a small part.
The payload ratio of 4.7 to i at approximately the same cost suggests that
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using the HLLV for personnel transport is more cost-effective, if the safety
of personnel can be assured. No other specific mission than personnel trans-
port is envisioned at the present time, but the concept of a general purpose/
emergency carrier is probably valid. The adaptation of the then existing
Shuttle at whatever payload capacity it has at that time is a reasonable
option for the purpose, but the specific development of the PLV is not recom-
mended for the SPS program unless at least one major and cost-effective use
can be found in addition to personnel transport. The HLLV, to be cost effec-
tive, must have at least the reliability associated with the Shuttle, and
should therefore be strongly considered for the personnel transport role as
well as that of a cargo transport.
Because the PLV can also be envisioned as NASA's general purpose
vehicle for other missions, the SPS program should probably not bear the full
burden of developing the PLV. Specifically, PLV's are estimated to have an
average cost of $673 million, of which $550 million is for the Shuttle
Orbiter and $123 million for the booster. Since 15 boosters are recommended
for the entire 60 Satellite SPS program, more would be spent on the booster
development ($2.6 billion) than on the boosters themselves ($1.962 billion),
and almost as much as our rough estimate of the total recurring costs of the
booster ($4.9 billion) over thirty years.
1.3.6 Personnel Orbit Transfer Vehicle (POTV) Conclusions
The major source of uncertainty for the POTV comes from the require-
ment for reusable engines and propellant insulation. The DDT & E estimate of
$1 billion is roughly consistent with past estimates of $1 billion for the
reusable Tug to be used on the Shuttle and is reasonable under the assumption
of ongoing technology programs for engines and avionics. The average unit
($44 million) and recurring cost per flight ($1.3 million) are reasonable
under the assumptions made for the program, specifically, technology inherit-
ance and co-development, and that the life estimate of 50 flights can be
achieved. The recurring cost per flight estimate in Reference 2 does not
include downtrip propellants (185 metric tons), about $50,000. The HLLV and
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EOTV costs for transport of the total of 385 MT of propellants are also not
included in this estimate, but have been included in the overall transport
cost scenario and the average transport cost for each SPS platform.
The personnel module and its associated life support equipment were
not included in this estimate because they represent reusable construction
support equipment. Both POTV's and personnel modules need to be available for
emergency use and are not included in the current estimates. Two (one at LEO
and one at GEO) are viewed as the minimum for emergency use and will require
$88 million in capital investment. If the capability to evacuate the GEO
station is required, five vehicles will be required as initial spares ($176
million) and this will slowly grow to twelve spares ($528 million) for POTV's
alone with additional expenses for personnel modules. These vehicles could be
used in normal operations so that they would not deteriorate with lack of use.
The twelve reserve POTV's calculated would raise the currently planned produc-
tion from 33 to 45, a 36 percent increase. An alternative emergency vehicle
which could evacuate the GEO station in one flight is considered likely to
cost as much, but the personnel shelter could also serve as the radiation
shelter. This concept would also "put all the eggs in one basket".
1.3.7 Intra-Orbital Transfer Vehicle (IOTV) Conclusions
The IOTV is not included in the NASA definition of space transporta-
tion because it supports orbital operations as well as space transport. The
area of orbital operations has not been investigated in the same level of
detail as has the area of transport and no firm definition is available at
this time. The contractors have identified several tasks which cannot be
satisfied by the same vehicle and, accordingly, there is no single IOTV
concept.
The POTV has been proposed as the large maintenance supply/work
station transport vehicle and was appropriately costed as such. A smaller
vehicle will be required for less demanding tasks in both LEO and GEO and we
have an unoptimized, preliminary design proposal for a small hydrogen/oxygen
stage which appears appropriate for tasks such as HLLV payload transfer to the
EOTV. It would also be used to maneuver payloads at GEO.
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Becausethe orbital operations plans have not progressed to the same
level of detail as the space transportation plans, no major conclusions can be
drawn. The concern remains that this is an area where significant dollar
growth can occur, but the potential percentage growth in transport and/or a
transport-related costs is not considered high under the current division of
the program. The cost uncertainties are viewed as coming from the human
accommodationsand their requirements rather than from the propulsion, tankage
and vehicle control avionics.
1.3.8 Program and Vehicle Costs and Uncertainty
Summary and Recommendations
The following Table 1.3.2 represents a summary of our conclusions
about the SPS transportation program, its costs and the uncertainty in those
costs. The cost estimates are repeated from those References (2,3). Our
recommended adjustments are also stated together with our estimates of
uncertainty in both estimates. The recommendations are based on very
elementary calculations which should be reconsidered in the future.
A large number of footnotes are given which briefly indicate the
source of the adjustment and other qua|ifications of the estimates. The
uncertainty estimates for the chemical vehicles are based on the uncertainty
typically associated with the CER methodology, +_15 percent. FOr the EOTV,
however, the uncertainty is rated very high and the value of -15 percent to
+100 percent is assigned. This is then related to the total $PS
transportation uncertainty by dollar weighted averaging.
The +_15 percent cost uncertainty estimated for the chemical vehicles
is a one-sigma estimate of the error. Because the error for the EOTV can only
be ratedas very high and the numeric value of -15 percent to +100 percent is
assigned by us to this statement, dollar weighted averaging has been used for
the overall cost uncertainty estimate. A sum of the variances estimate is not
believed to be appropriate to the overall estimate because it would include
the EOTV's assigned error estimate.
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(I)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
TABLE 1.3.2 SPS TRANSPORTATION COST ESTIMATES
ADJUSTMENTS AND UNCERTAINTIES
($, Millions, 1977)
Footnotes
Reference 2 (Appendix B)
Does not include research; a strong precursor technology program is
assumed.
Addition of one reserve HLLV and strict application of 85 percent
learning curve.
10 percent Payload Reserve for Growth in SPS and Miscellaneous
Requirements
Addition of five reserve vehicles to fleet; mature industry assumption.
If learning at 70 percent is applied to TFU, initial investment is $19
billion.
10 percent Cost reserve for operation of orbital maintenance facilities.
PLV booster co-developed with HLLV.
Battelle estimate of development cost of personnel module for HLLV.
Purchase of 2 PLVs without personnel module.
Purchase of one additional HLLV in addition to reserve vehicle.
22 percent of HLLV cost per flight
Purchase of 5 POTVs with strict application of 85 percent learning
curve.
Adjustment reflects direct charge of 1 HLLV flight plus 5 percent of
EOTV flight costs plus $50K downtrip propellants to POTV. Personnel
Module Excl uded.
Reference 2 corectly accounts for POTV costs in overall transport
scenario.
6425 man-years at KSC at $40/hour.
Dollar weighted average of uncertainties.
Includes reserve vehicles and mature industry assumption for EOTV.
Includes Ground Support at KSC.
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2.0 REVIEW OF SPS TRANSPORT REQUIREMENTS,
COSTING METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
2.1 SPS Requirements and their Translation
into Transportation Requirements
The payload characteristics associated with construction and main-
tenance of a system of geostationary-orbit solar power satellites (SPS's) have
been detailed, and include not only the SPS materials, but also the facil-
ities, supplies, and orbital transfer vehicles (OTV's) to support manned con-
struction and maintenance in space. (Reference 2). The translation of these
payload characteristics, shown in Table 2.1, into transportation requirements
was made on the basis of: (1) The SPS reference program and the underlying
construction assumptions; (2) the implementation scenario, including construc-
tion and maintenance schedules and crew requirements.
The following discussion first focuses on the reference program. The
implementation scenario and underlying assumptions are then examined, and the
impact on the payload delivery schedules determined. Cost impacts are in-
ferred in this discussion.
2.1.1 SPS Reference Program
The reference SPS program is based on construction of two 5 GW SPS's
_^_i of _n _atpllites. To accomplish this, two space basesper year, for a v ..........
are constructed in the initial phase of the program. The Low Earth Orbit
(LEO) base functions as a staging depot and orbital transfer vehicle construc-
tion facility. Payloads from earth arriving on recoverable, heavy lift launch
vehicles (HLLV's) are accummulated, and those destined for the Geosynchronous
Equitorial Orbit (GEO) base are transferred to orbital transfer vehicles.
Crew transfers between personnel launch vehicles (PLV's) and personnel orbital
transfer vehicles (POTV's) are also accomplished at the LEO base.
Actual satellite construction and maintenance operations are accomp-
lished in geosynchronous orbit, with the GEO base providing work and crew
facilities in addition to the four-bay end-builder which constructs the base-
line 8 x 16 bay SPS in two successive passes. Figure 2.1.2 displays the GEO
Construction Concept (D 180-2503/6 Boeing).
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TABLE2.1.1 PAYLOADCHARACTERISTICS(MASS)
(ALL WEIGHTSIN METRICTONS)
SPS
Satellite (1)
Allowance for Breakage (2%)
Total per Satellite
LEOBASE
Base
CrewFacilities Supplies/Yr
WorkFacilities Supplies/Yr
GEOBASE
Base
CrewFacilities Supplies/Yr
WorkFacilities Supplies/Yr
EOTV
Vehicle
Propellant/Flight
Regurbishment/Flight
POTV- CREWROTATION/SUPPLY
Stage
Propellant/Flight (Up/Dn)
Refurbi shment/Fl ight
Personnel Module
SPSMAINTENANCE
SPSSupplies/Satellite/Yr
Crew & WorkFacilities/20 Satellites
Crew& Work Supplies/Yr/20 Satellites
POTVMaintenance Sortie Prop/Satellite/Yr
50,984
1,020
52,004
1,603
313
72
4,800
568
683
1,462
515
40
14
200/185
0.1
53
236
1,154
206
25
Source: Reference 2.
2.1.2 Implementation Scenario and Underl),in_ Assumptions
The Implementation Scenario for the reference SPS program consists of
(1) an initial period, during which the LEO and GEO bases and the orbital
transfer vehicle fleets are constructed; (2) a one-year period for construc-
tion of the first 5 GW SPS; and (3) a 29 1/2 year operational phase, during
which 59 SPS's are constructed at a rate of two per year.
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There are two documented versions of the implementation scenario.
The Johnson Space Center (JSC) data book (Reference 2) defines an initial two
year period for assembly of bases in LEO and GEO, and for fabrication of the
orbital transfer vehicle fleet. The first SPS, requiring one year construc-
tion time, is then completed at the end of the third year. The Work Breakdown
Structure (WBS) Document (Reference 4), however, defines the commercial phase
commencing after six months of test operation of a demonstration satellite, at
which time construction of the orbital transfer vehicle fleet and GEO base
begins. Construction of the first full-scale (5 GW) satellite is initiated 2
1/2 years into this commercial phase. Again, one year is allotted for con-
struction of the first 5 GW SPS, so that 3-1/2 years of the commercial phase
have passed before the nominal production rate of two per year is established.
Figure 2.3 compares these two versions of the SPS program implementation
scenario. As can be seen in this figure, the WBS version allows more time for
orbital transfer vehicle production and GEO base construction prior to
initiation of SPS construction. The JSC version allows only 1-I/2 years for
these activities versus 2 I/2 years in the WBS version. The other obvious
difference between the two scenarios is that the WBS version allows for
construction and test operation of a demonstration satellite prior to com-
mercial SPS construction. Thus, in this version, construction of the LEO base
is completed prior to construction of demonstration satellite; whereas, in the
JSC version, LEO base construction consumes six months of the initial
scenario. Clearly, the WBS scenario is more conservative in terms of time and
therefore risk and higher in cost than the JSC scenario.
To define payload delivery requirements to accomplish the implementa-
tion scenario, crew requirements and maintenance requirements must be defined.
The LEO base crew requirements for depot operations have been documented as
200 persons (JSC & WBS). An additional 35 persons are based at LEO during OTV
fleet construction. The GEO base crew requirements for SPS construction were
documented as 440 persons. In addition, the GEO crew requirements for twice-
a-year maintenance of completed satellites is an additional 20 persons per
satellite, so that 40 persons are added to the GEO maintenance crew each year,
once the nominal production rate of two SPS's per year has been achieved.
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Crew rotation is assumed to be once every 90 days so that crew
transportation requirements per year are four times the crew size which grows
from approximately 700 to 1800 over the SPS construction phase.
A payload requirement which is related to crew size is consumables.
Estimates for personnel consumables were documeBted as 200 kg per man-month
(Boeing NAS 9-15196). Reference 3 estimated requirements for personnel con-
sumables at 5 kg per person-day, including oxygen supplies. This amounts to
150 kg per person-month, compared to the Boeing estimate of 200 kg per person-
month. Annual requirements shown for personnel consumables shown in Table 2.1
are based on JSC estimates which result in annual consumption of 1.7 metric
tons per person-year or 141 kg per person-month. This is tight and does not
specify any on-orbit storage of consumables. If the Boeing estimate, 42 per-
cent greater, is used, the equivalent from one to three additional HLLV
launches per year would be required as the program progresses through the 30
year construction phase.
The area of human consumables is the only area of SPS planning where
data exist to test independently the SPS platform and operations mass require-
ment assumptions. It is expected that a similar range of mass uncertainty
(e.g., 42 percent or + 20 percent from some nominal value) can be shown for
the SPS platforms and construction bases. The early stage of the SPS designs,
however, does not permit this type of analysis on other than a hypothetical
basis. Under the program assumptions and mass estimates, however, the
arithmetical translation of mass requirements into payloads has been done
reasonably and correctly.
The basic JSC mass transport scenario and its requirements are sum-
marized in Appendix B. The number of flights required for the HLLV was based
on a net payload of 360 MT while the gross lift capability of the HLLV is pro-
jected at 424 MT. This 17 percent reserve includes 2 percent for breakage and
15 percent for packaging and palleting. These are reasonable allowances for
average effect calculations, although considerable variance can be expected
depending on the nature of the specific load being carried.
Because of the likelihood of growth in mass requirements fqr the SPS
platforms and assembly bases, we recommend an additional 10 percent growth
allowance in HLLV payloads and therefore numbers of flights. This is
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approximately half the uncertainty in humanconsumablesrequirements, but the
SPSdesigns are muchmore subject to engineering efforts than are human
comforts.
No additional growth allowance is recommendedfor the EOTVbecause
the effect of larger payloads will be to slow the vehicle and makethe trip
longer. Longer trips (already 180 days) or more trips will change the fleet
size requirement, but should not affect the cost per flight significantly.
Fleet size considerations, however, are discussed later in terms of reli-
ability and availability.
Table 2.1.4 summarizesthe massand personnel transport plan for the
Reference Systemto illustrate the year-by-year growth in masstransport
requi r ements•
2-8
L_
I'--
Z
L_
I,
O
I.L
Z
..-J
_..
o
ca')
z
h-
.--J
ILl
Z
O
L_
_4
I--
.._ o
E
Z
._ _.- ._.._
O
I-- i
i
0_J "o
=_ o I---
or--
O
L
O
o_
_.- _ ._-.,
c_ I---
O _"
X
A
_1.-.
t._ O P.,
L
OOOOOOOOOOOOO O
_OOOOOOOOO O O
e,-
O
I--.
_- 0
r0 _-
0 E-_-_
,-- 0
0
_- UO
ro L_.I
;.13_ _.0 u3
'_ 0 -;-
¢_ LI.I Ill
_ m
_- _,_ o '_:" _J
r._ _.- _ f-.
,.--,I--I--,--4
2-9
2.2 SPS Designs to Meet Transportation Requirements
In the last section, annual transporation requirements for the SPS
space segment were categorized by trans_rt mission (LEO or GEO), and ex-
pressed in metric tons (cargo) or number of man-flights (crew rotation). In
this section, the discussion will focus first on the transport vehicle de-
signs, flight times, and fleet requirements to meet the annual transportation
requirements. The cost estimates for each transport element will be reviewed.
2.2.1 Transport Vehicle Designs
Five transport missions have been identified: (1) cargo transport
between Earth and LEO; (2) personnel transport between Earth and LEO: (3)
cargo transport between LEO and GEO; (4) personnel transport between LEO and
GEO; (5) intra-orbital transport of cargo and personnel.
The cost estimates for and implications of the Reference Design
vehicles, their production and use schedules to meet those missions are dis-
cussed in terms permitting a critical understanding of the choices made for
the SPS program. The alternative designs and their implications are briefly
discussed to indicate the reasons why they were not selected for the Reference
Design and to indicate the conditions which would change that decision.
2.2.1.1 Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle (HLLV). Three candidate designs
were identified in initial SPS studies: (1) a winged entry/recovery; (2) a
ballistic entry/recovery; (3) a winged entry/recovery with expendable hydrogen
tank. In both the Rockwell and the Boeing Definition Studies, recoverable
launch vehicle design was based on the winged entry/recovery concept. One
Rockwell design is a single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) vehicle, with a 91 metric
ton payload capability which looks and would operate much like an airplane.
Another Rockwell design is a parallel burn, cross-fed propellant configura-
tion. Both represent advanced technology. The leading Boeing design is a
two-stage winged vehicle, with a 424 metric ton gross payload capability
(360-374 metric tons net payload).
The Boeing HLLV design was selected as the reference design for the
SPS Program because it requires a lower level of technology development and
therefore provides a higher level of confidence that the vehicle could be
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developed for an SPSoperational capability by the year 2000. The Boeing
design uses manyof the developments being incorporated in the Shuttle while
the rockwell SSTOwould require extensive efforts to develop the requisite
technology, especially for the engines. There are also other designs _ich
are intermediate in technology development requirements. The goal of all
these designs is to provide high reusability and thus low operating costs in
comparison with the Shuttle, which requires extensive refurbishment after each
flight. TheBoeing design for the HLLVwas selected as a compromisebetween
development cost and recurring cost with the advantage that its technological
readiness is believed to be higher than the competitors.
While the turn around time between flights for a design concept can
be only roughly estimated at this time, the airplane-like configuration gives
promise of airplane-like operations. The projected turn around time of one
day for the Rockwell SSTOconcept v_uld compare very well in terms of time,
labor, and therefore, moneyto the Boeing design. The Boeing HLLV, with two
stages, has four and five day turn-around times, and requires a large launch
platform to erect the vehicle for a vertical launch.
Becausethe costs of the initial trip to LEOare the major (70 per-
cent) componentof transportation costs for operational SPSplatforms, the
goal of low recurring costs is imperative to permit low SPScosts. Low recur-
ring costs imply a highly reusable vehicle with minimal costs in the refur-
bishment after each flight. The technological developments in the years
before commitmentto a specific SPSand its transport system may provide a
better indication of whether truly significant cost reductions can be achieved
with reasonable development expenditure for the SPS. Until such improvements
in basic vehicle technology are, or are indicated, to be available, the Boeing
HLLVconcept appears to be the reasonable choice.
2.2.1.2 Personnel Launch Vehicle (PLV). In the Rockwell transporta-
tion design, the HLLV provided crew transportation between Earth and LEO, so
there was no dedicated personnel launch vehicle.
The Boeing Definition Study, however, specified a Space Shuttle
derivative for crew and priority cargo transport between Earth and LEO. The
PLV design consists of a winged flyback booster with four engines similar to
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the HLLV booster engines, a smaller version of the Shuttle external tank and
the Shuttle orbiter. Its payload capability to LEO is 89 metric tons. No
Ylight turn around time was specified.
The concept of the PLV as a personnel and light cargo vehicle may
have some validity, but it is difficult to perceive at this time. The cost-
per-flight is estimated to be very near that of the HLLV ($10M). The payload
ratio is 4.7 to one (424/89) and safety-reliability should be very similar to
that of the HLLV. Clear]y, the cost-effectiveness of the PLV is open to ques-
tion. Since the PLV (or a similar Shuttle derivative) will likely be the
major NASA vehicle for its programs in this period, the question of how exist-
ing vehicles are used in the SPS program needs thorough consideration. For
example, test articles will probably be flown on them. Since the exact cap-
ability of Shuttle derivatives is conjectural at this time, the question of
whether and how they can be used in a cost-effective manner remains open.
2.2.1.3 Cargo Orbital Transfer Vehicle (COTV). Both the Rockwell
and Boeing Definition Study designs for the low-thrust COTV are based on an
electric-powered, ion-propelled vehicle, with a payload capability of ap-
proximately 4000 metric tons (about ten HLLV payloads).
While the Boeing EOTV design was selected as the Reference Design,
the implicit commitment to Silicon photovoltaic cells has not been made by the
SPS program because the knowledge does not yet exist to justify the commitment
at this time. The selection of an electric propulsion vehicle was made be-
cause the very high fuel efficiency of these designs avoids the necessity of
transporting large quantities of chemical propellants to LEO. This advantage
is so large that the decision would probably not change unless two conditions
are met: (1) the cost of constructing and using the electric propulsion
vehicles is several times more expensive than is currently envisioned, and (2)
the cost per pound of transporting propellants to LEO drops by at least 50
percent from that projected for the HLLV.
The fundamental design of the EOTV and the SPS satellites is expected
to be very similar. The SPS will convert sunlight into electricity and elec-
tricity to microwaves which are beamed back to Earth. The EOTV will use the
electricity to accelerate ions in an engine. Because of this fundamental
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similarity, if condition (1) occurs, the SPS concept is very likely to have
severe difficulty in being cost-competitive with terrestrial sources of power.
Since there is very little experience with electrical propulsions and
no electrical stage has yet been flown, the uncertainties associated with this
concept are large. Because of the similarity of EOTV design with that of the
SPS platform, the uncertainty in EOTV cost estimates can only be that associ-
ated with the SPS platform. For purposes of calculations of the uncertainty
in total transport costs, we assign the value of -15 percent to +100 percent.
If other studies show the SPS platform cost uncertainty to have a different
value, this value should be used as a substitute.
2.2.1.4 Personnel Orbital Transfer Vehicle (POTV). The POTV pro-
vides rapid transport of crew and high priority cargo between LEO and GEO.
The POTV is also used for maintenance sorties between the GEO base and the
satellites. In both the Rockwell and Boeing Definition Studies, the POTV
designs were based on a two-stage reusable vehicle capable of carrying out a
round trip mission between LEO and GEO without refueling. In the Rockwell
version, each of the stagesweighed 91 metric tons and the payload capability
was 91 metric tons, so that each POTV was assembled at LEO from three HLLV
payloads (the Rockwell HLLV design payload specification was 91 metric tons).
The Boeing Definition Study PTOV design entailed a larger two-stage
chemically-powered vehicle (890 metric tons without payload) with a payload
capability of 150 metric tons up (LEO to GEO) and 90 metric tons return.
Neither of these two designs was chosen as the reference vehicle
design. Instead, a single-stage vehicle requiring refueling at GEO was
selected, with payload capability of 90 metric tons, sufficient to carry 80
passengers and 6600 man-days of crew supplies. This design reduces the total
POTV propellant requirement, utilizing the more efficient EOTV to transport
the POTV return propellant to GEO. The design is usually pictured with a
passenger module. This module, however, is not included in the cost
statements as it is considered to be part of the orbital support equipment.
The estimated mass and payload of the module used for performance calculations
are reasonable and produce the stated results. The estimated turn-around time
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of five days is also reasonable under the assumption of a maintenance depot
in LEOwith frequent resupply of parts from the surface.
Chemical propulsion for humansfrom LEOto GEOwas selected for the
short trip time (5 1/2 hours, one way). While electric propulsion is more
l
mass-efficient, the trip time would be of the order of weeks, resulting in a
significant reduction in time spent on the work station and a long stay in the
Van Allen radiation belts. In addition, solar particle radiation storms can
take place with little or no warning and require prompt trips to shelters or
evacuation of humans from space. Accordingly, it is unlikely that the POTV
concept will change significantly, but the size or number of people trans-
ported will be subject to later optimization.
The Reference System transportation plans do not include any discus-
sion or cost allowances for emergency evacuation of GEO or LEO. This will
require either a fleet of POTVs and a personnel module aboard the HLLV or a
radiation shelter module with a big chemical OTV. The radiation shelter could
also serve as the LEO to surface personnel module. The low number of PLVs
planned and their turn-around time appear to preclude use of the PLV for
emergency evacuation. The number of POTVs required will range from 5 early in
the program when the construction crew in GEO is approximately 440 to 20 near
the end of the construction phase when almost 1200 SPS maintenance workers
will be added to the 440 construction workers. Since the POTV is planned for
orbital operations and maintenance work, there may be enough PTOVs for
emergency evacuation. The large number needed toward the end of the program,
however, suggests that at some point in the program the _,,=,_=,I_,_'L-I_^-_nT_v.,
concept might prove cost-effective.
2.2.1.5 Intra-Orbital Transfer Vehicle(s) (IOTV). The IOTVs are
viewed as being part Of the orbital operations and not as part of the trans-
portation system. The orbital operations have not been studied as intensively
as the transportation requirements and the documentation°is therefore not as
extensive. The POTV has been proposed to meet requirements involving trans-
port of large masses and/or numbers of people. There are some preliminary
and unoptimized designs for lesser requirements such as the transfer of pay-
loads from the HLLV to the EOTV and to maneuver payloads at GEO. In addition
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we expect there will evolve a requirement for a "one or two man" inspection/
service vehicle. All these will service the transport vehicles as well as the
SPS and their costs, while small in terms of the overall transport budget,
have no allocation included in present estimates of transport costs.
2.2.3 SPS Transport Vehicle Cost Estimates and
Initial Investment Analysis
Parametric cost models (PCM) were used to determine the DDT&E and TFU
(Theoretical First Unit) cost estimates for each transport element (HLLV, PLV,
EOTV, POTV). These models take into account the mass, volume, and per-
formance characteristics of individual subsystems of the vehicle, as well as
subjective estimators of subsystem complexity and state-of-the-art (new design
versus off-the-shelf). The PCMs compute the DDT&E and TFU cost estimates
based on these estimates, as well as historical and parametric data from the
aircraft and aerospace industries. The TFU estimates, associated with the
costs of the production of the first element, can then be used with a learning
curve to determine unit production costs. According to the JSC Data Book and
statements from Boeing, a learning curve factor of % = 0.85 is applicable at
the vehicle level for aircraft industry production. This means that the pro-
duction cost of an individual unit falls 15 percent every time the production
volume is doubled. That is, if the cost of the first unit is the TFU, the
cost to produce the second unit is .85 x TFU, the cost to produce the fourth
unit is (.85) 2 x TFU, etc., or:
[In_ l
Cost of Nth unit = TFU x N power Li-_-_] , where _ = 0.85 for the aircraftindustry.
The DDT&E and TFU cost estimates developed from the Boeing Parametric
Cost Model (PCM) are _hown in Table 2.2.1, in 1977 dollars. Using the TFU
cost estimates, the initial investment cost for each transport element can be
determined, utilizing an 85 percent learning curve at the vehicle level. This
analysis is shown in Table 2.2.1. The initial investment includes 6 HLLV's, 2
PLV's, 23 EOTV's, and 2 POTV's, and totals over 39 billion dollars (1977
dollars).
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It is interesting to compare the results of this analysis with the
analysis in the WBS document, which computes the average unit costs of major
subsystems of each transport element over the entire production period,
TABLE 2.2.1. COST ESTIMATES WITH 85 PERCENT LEARNING
(Millions of 1977 Dollars)
Transport
Element DDT&E TFU
Initial Investment rln l
Cost = TFU x N power
: 0.85) U
HLLV $11,202 $1,748
PLV 2,616 790
COTV/EOTV 2,247 2,126
6 VEHICLES ()L: 0.85)
#I (TFU) 1,748 #4 1,263
#2 i,486 #5 1,199
#3 1,351 #6 1,148
2 VEHICLES
23 VEHICLES
#1 2,126 # 8 1,306
#2 1,807 # 9 1,270
#3 1,643 #10 1,239
#4 1,536 #11 1,212
#5 1,458 #12 1,187
#6 1,397 #13 1,165
#7 1,347 #14 1,145
POTV 1,012 100 2 VEHICLES
TOTALS $17,077 $4,764
#15 1,127
#1 790
#2 671.5
$1,461.5
#16 1,110
#17 1,094
#18 1,080
#19 1,066
#20 1,053
#21 1,041
#22 1,030
#23 1,019
$2--9,457
#i $100
#2 85
Source: Reference 2 (in DDT&E and TFU)
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including refurbishment, and uses these figures in determining the commercial
phase initial investment. The results of this analysis are summarized below.
HLLV $ 6,072
PLV 1,891
COTV/ 5,990
EOTV
POTV
2,271
112
(6 stage 1; 7 stage 2; tooling & GSE)
(2 boosters; 2 orbiters; 47 ET's; Tooling & GSE)
(21 construction vehicles)
(8 maintenance vehicles)
(2 vehicles; tooling & GSE)
(Millions of 1977 Dollars)
It should be noted that the WBS analysis determined the average unit
costs of major subsystems based on the TFU's developed by the Boeing PCM and
assuming learning curve factors of 85 percent to 90 percent, so that the large
differences between the "strict" application of the learning curve at a ve-
hicle level in the analysis of initial investment (Table 2.2.1) versus the WBS
analysis based on average unit costs is not attributable to different TFU
assumptions. The major difference between the two analyses is EOTV initial
investment. Referring to the EOTV category in Table 2.2,1, it can be seen
that the cost of the 21st unit, computed strictly according to an 85 percent
learning curve, is $1,041 billion, slightly less than half of the TFU cost.
The average unit cost used in the WBS analysis is $285 million, and is based,
not on a learning curve assumption, but on a mixture of learning curve and
"mature industry" costing. The reasoning is: (I) the annual production rate
assumed, four EOTV's per year, implies high enough production rates of thrust-
ers and solar cells to warrant use of mature industry costing (production cost
is two times the material costs); (2) the production rates of the power
conditioning components (processors, switchgear, etc.) is sufficiently high to
warrant learning values of 70 percent (faster-falling learning curve than the
85 percent curve); and (3) other components with lower production rates are
still costed with 85 percent learning assumption.(a)
(a) From SPS Transportation Workshop, JSC/Boeing SPS Orbit Transfer Vehicle
Analysis, Huntsville, Ala., January, 1980.
!
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The figures presented with these assumptions are shown below, and compared
with the TFU subsystem cost estimates:
JSC/Boein 9
Power Generation/Distribution
Electric Propulsion
Avionics
Programmatic
Tot aI
Avg. Avg. Unit
Unit Cost/
Cost TFU TFU
$ 99.7 $924 (I0.8%)
141.0 777 (18%)
6.5 14 (46.5%)
36.6
283.6 (sic)
This costing approach is open to challenge. First, EOTV assembly
will take place at LEO, and so it is questionable that final production costs
will be only two times the materials costs, even though this may be a valid
cost assumption for ground-based mature industry production of individual
components. Second, the nature of a cost curve based on learning implicitly
accounts for cost reduction as a function of production volume achieved. The
rationale for using a 70 percent learning curve for power conditioning
components, namely that the production rate warrants it, seems arbitrary.
Documentation supporting these assumptions must be sought in further SPS study
efforts via thorough studies of analogous production situations.
While the mature industry assumption is questionable for early as-
sembly of EOTV's in space, it is essential to the SPS platform and therefore
to many aspects of the EOTV. Entire industries will have to be established
for solar cell production and for the fabrication of SPS structure components.
For the silicon photovoltaic SPS design (5 km x 10 km) the production rate
implied is 72 acres per day, 365 days per year. The structure will have the
same requirement on an areal basis.
2-18
2.3 Costing Methodology Used In These Estimates_
Its Appropriateness and Limitations
The methodology used to derive the basic cost estimates made for SPS
studies is known under a variety of names including the "extrapolation method"
or the "top-down method". Essentially, information on past programs relevant
to the technology in question (in this case aerospace efforts for aircraft and
space vehicles) has been collected to form a data base covering the level of
effort and resources needed to produce systems and physical characteristics of
the systems. This data base is then used to estimate the effort required to
develop and produce a new system by extrapolating the effort-physical char-
acteristic relationship to the region of the new system.
The effort required can be expressed either in terms of labor hours
by various categories (engineering, production, etc) and materials or in terms
of inflation-adjusted dollars. The alternate ways of expressing effort can be
considered equivalent and are related to each other through the appropriate
wage rates and prices; correctly selected rates provide not only market dif-
ferentials in skills but also costs of benefits and overhead. The physical
characteristics used to relate the effort required for given systems are
usually elementary ones such as total weight of the system (or specific sub-
systems), electrical power consumption, heat dissipation, etc. These char-
acteristics are frequently not of ultimate interest (such as payload) but
reflect elementary properties common to all systems. These effort or resource
requirements and the associated physical characteristics are usually stored in
computer files and the Cost Estimating Relationships (CERs) used for such pro-
jects as the SPS are derived using statistical techniques. These relation-
ships are, however, usually based on empirical curve-fitting as illustrated in
Figure 2.3.1.
This figure shows the type of relationship which can be developed by
using statistical techniques to derive a cost estimating relationship (CER)
(A) and error bonds (B, C) when considering all available information. Tech-
niques such as least-squares fits to elementary formulas are typically con-
sidered most appropriate. If there are theoretical or pragmatic reasons for
excluding some data points or sets of data points, or weighting o_her points
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more strongly such as the circled x's, different relationships can be develop-
ed (e.g., DI,D2) from the same data. Thus, the development of appropriate
CERs is as much an art as a science. The CER methodology evolved from opera-
tions research techniques developed during World War II and the methodology is
capable of handling very complex situations and providing an assessment of the
expected error. Error bands are thus indicated in Figure 2.3.1 for the hypo-
thetical CER defined by line A.(*) The methodology for handling errors for
an entire system based on the errors for individual CERs is complex, and ap-
plies to specific system estimates as contrasted with generalized statements
which apply to all uses of the methodology.
The CERs used for the reference vehicles are extracted from the
Boeing Company's proprietary data base covering man-hours and materials for
their past programs and are used to formulate their bids. Our request for
access to the Boeing CERs was denied for this reason. The Boeing estimates
also did not include any documentation or estimate of the error associated
with their estimates. This is also to be expected because the error estimates
applied to the work breakdown structure could be used with analytical tech-
niques and other publicly available information to give a good approximation
to the CERs. Accordingly, the error estimates for this application must be
stated from a general observation.
The usual error statements for this methodology are phrased in terms
of +__I0 or +_ 15 percent as applied to a specific design and contain assump-
tions that are usually not explicitly stated. These assumptions are: (I) The
technology to be used is or will be available shortly and the gap between
current technology and the proposed technology or capability is not large--a
factor of 2 in capability is large in this sense. (2) The design costed is in
fact used. If the design hypothesized for costing is not used because later
information shows that design is not preferred for technical reasons, the
statement about its cost is not directly applicable to the replacement and the
direct applicability of expenditures accummulated in investigating and
(*) See J. Klion, "Recent Experience in the Development and Application of
Life Cycle Cost Models" in AGARD Lecture Series No. I00. (NATO Advisory
Group for R and D, ISBN-92-835-1321-5)
I
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developing the old design is a matter of luck and cannot be planned. This
later assumption differs somewhat from the expectation in more conventional
projects such as bridges and buildings where significantly different designs
can be built for approximately the same total costs.
This costing methodology follows technical choices and usually does
not direct them because the independent parameters (such as weight) usually
reflect design choices rather than cause them. Thus in explaining this meth-
odology and the certainty associated with its estimates, it can be said that
the uncertainty for any given design within the reach of current technology is
+ 10 percent + or 15 percent; the problem is selecting a design which one
believes is technically sound and meets program goals.
This type of uncertainty statement then is an approximation to
probabilistic statements based on variance in parameters in past programs. No
specific calculations of the frequently quoted figures of + 10 and + 15 per-
cent have been found in a search of the literature. It is expected that this
is an empirical observation of the cost discrepancies in review of programs
meeting the assumptions stated previously.
Since the HLLV and EOTV fall outside of first assumption, [that the
growth in capability (payload) is incremented rather than a major leap], it
might be expected that the uncertainty would be much larger than this estimate
of + 15 percent. A separate assessment of NASA's hisLurical experience made
in section 2.4., however, shows that for the SPS vehicles proposed, the ex-
pectation is that the uncertainty is relatively low. This is primarily due to
the relative conventionality of the Reference Vehicles in comparison with the
Shuttle. The major exception is the EOTV which is acknowledged to be a major
step in technology. Even the EOTV will, by the time of the SPS, have relevant
experience if NASA builds a solar electric propulsion stage during the 1980's
as has been proposed.
It is noted, moreover, that the Reference SPS program is not a fixed
target; the SPS transport designs can be expected to change, perhaps radical-
ly, between the present and such time as test vehicles are built. The current
cost estimates are not generic and cannot be applied to other designs with
similar purpose but different technology.
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Alternative Methodologies can be grouped under the name of bottom-up
or itemized costing techniques. These are usually applied to projects such as
buildings, dams, or refineries where previous experience yields information on
the actual labor and material costs to be expected. When design changes and
accidents and strikes during the construction projects are excluded, the
biggest sources of error are usually due to causes such as price changes in
materials being greater than expected, or labor rates rising faster than
expected -- in other words, misjudging inflation. The effect of accidents or
strikes can be taken into the cost estimates on the basis of past experience
as an expectation, but this is usually handled through insurance and specific
labor agreements. The expected error on costs derived from itemized or
bottom-up costing techniques is usually +_ 5 percent, with most of the error
due to misjudgment of future supply and labor prices. These cost estimates
are then turned into a bid by the contractor who wants a profit of from I0
percent to 20 percent on top of the costs. Bids based on a relatively low
profit margin such as I0 percent will usually have a cost escalation clause
which shifts the risk of price increases to the purchaser. Bids which are
truly fixed price will include a profit margin, such as 20 percent, which
insure the contractor against unexpected price increases.
Bottom-up estimating techniques, however, require highly detailed
plans and designs, literally down to the number of nuts and bolts. The SPS
designs have not been carried out to this level of detail, hence bottom-up
estimates cannot be made. Accordingly, the top-down or extrapolation tech-
niques are the only reasonable method of making the cost estimates for vehi-
cles at this stage of the SPS program. For elements such as ground
facilities, the estimates have been extrapolated from analogous existing
facilities when they could have been made by an architectural engineering firm
using rough plans. The amount of effort required and the uncertainty of the
ground facility requirements strongly suggests that the gain in certainty of
these costs would not justify this additional expenditure at this time.
Application and Limits of the Methodology
The estimates derived using extrapolation techniques, specifically
Boeing's parametric cost model, were then applied to the construction scenario
! ....
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requiring a total of 60 power satellites over a period of approximately 33
years with a brief program build-up phase leading to a satellite construction
rate of two per year. The vehicle cost model yields separate estimates of the
design and development cost (DDT&E) and a theoretical first vehicle unit cost
(TFU). Past experience in manufacturing shows that the first vehicle is the
most difficult to make and that subsequent vehicles will cost less down to
some distant limit at which the manufacturing labor efficiency increases very
slowly with the existing equipment and facilities. This is approximated as a
family of learning curves, as shown in Figure 2.3.2 where both individual and
cumulative cost factors are shown for a variety of potential learning
situations.
Boeing asserts that its experience with commercial aircraft and other
projects indicates that the 85 percent learning curve is the most appropriate
Q
for most SPS vehicles and holds for total production runs into the range of
i300 - 1400 (e.g., the Boeing 727). This is consistent with other experience
in aerospace work where curves in the range of 70 percent to 90 percent are
common and the production runs are typically less than 1000.(9)
The average unit hardware cost was then calculated from the total
production run over the life of the program. The average cost per flight was
then determined from the average hardware cost per flight (vehicle cost/
expected number of flights) and the estimated average costs of maintaining the
vehicle on a per flight basis. The SPS transportation program costs, as stat-
ed, are then based on this average cost per fli-h._,._+ m:c_....__ fhp............number of flights
required by the program. This method is appropriate for early stages of
program planning, but has two major problems:
1. The early and high unit cost of the first batch of the vehicles
is not clearly identified as a potential cash flow problem for
the SPS program.
2. There is uncertainty associated with the close conjunction of the
development program and the actual learning experienced on the
first vehicles (as contrasted with the expected learning) and
this uncertainty is also not clearly identified.
The major problem foreseen in the use of average unit cost calcula-
tions is that the transportation program will appear to have a smoother or
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more uniform expenditure level than can be achieved when the strict learning
curve calculations are used. This problem will be especially acute with the
EOTV where additional assumptions about the learning effects on some high
usage components have been made, and in the case of the PLV booster where the
SPS program's use of the booster is low.
The problem of uncertainty in the costs due to failure to achieve the
projected learning of 85 percent at any given time has been examined using
elementary calculations of the effects of both small and large deviations in
the estimates. If it is assumed that 85 percent learning can be achieved, as
expected, the effect on the total program is small, but there would be a tem-
porary larger cash funding requirement which would partially be recovered in
later, lower costs.
The major uncertainties impacting total program costs of the SPS
platform are still the recurring costs of reusing the SPS vehicles. The
effects of large uncertainties in development and theoretical first unit costs
are swamped by the extensive use of the vehicles. The effect of deviations
from the 85 percent learning curve estimated by Boeing in the range of 80
percent and 90 percent learning curves result in per flight cost differentials
of less than I0 percent if refurbishment is held constant, well within the
uncertainty of the supporting CER's. This can be illustrated using Figure
2.3.2 giving the learning curves. The difference between 80 and 90 percent
learning curves when the projected learning curve is 85 percent is
approximately I0 percent on the cost factor scale. Since this factor applies
only to the vehicle hardware cost and not to refurbishment and fuel, the
effect on average transportation costs less. Thus, errors in estimating
learning curves are expected to result in cost shifts well within the
uncertainty of the CER methodology used.
Accordingly, while the use of average hardware unit costs in calcula-
ting the total program costs can lead to optimistic views of early program
costs, the method selected for estimating these costs is reasonable and, of
itself, does not magnify uncertainties. With the exception of the PLV
booster, where the original SPS procurement of hardware is 2 units, the pro-
curements are large enough to place the production over the "knee" of the
learning curve so that the use of the average cost is reasonable, if not
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precise. The exception, the PLVbooster, is an item which would very likely
be procured for other space program activities, and thus incur a higher
initial production.
With the use of the learning curve factors to achieve an average unit
hardware costs, and estimates of refurbishment and full costs, the calculation
of average costs per flight is straight-forward and has been done in an appro-
priate manner. The fuel and refurbishment costs have their own uncertainties,
but the methodology and resultant cost estimates are fully appropriate at this
stage of the SPSprogram.
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2.4 Historical Experience
2.4.1 Theoretical and Historical Results
This report assesses the accuracy and completeness of the estimates
for SPS space transport costs via analyses of the proposed program and the
performance and its implications for the vehicles. These.analyses have used
past experience with launch vehicles and aircraft as the guide to determining
areas where expenses may be different than projeeted, such as the need for ad-
ditional vehicles if 100 percent reliability is not achieved as well as the
potential problems associated with the rapid deployment scenario. The funda-
mental question remains, however, of whether the vehicles can be developed,
built and operated under these costs and scenario proposed with the modifica-
tions determined in this report.
If the designs proposed are used in the SPS program, the conclusion
is yes. In the face of historical examples of significant cost overruns in
past and present military and space programs, it is necessary to support this
conclusion with a justification and to illustrate this justification with some
detailed examples. These examples also indicate some of the conditions, un-
stated assumptions and indirect costs which are not presented in the SPS
transportation cost estimates, and which must be met for success.
One of these conditions has already been mentioned; that the designs
proposed must be similar to those used. The o_._.,v "k_÷_"tlnn......nf a vehicle such as
Rockwell's single-stage-to-orbit aerospace plane would drastically increase
the uncertainty in costs. Development of new technology such as required for
the Rockwell SSTO usually encounter unanticipated problems and the likelihood
of cost growth would be very high. The historical analogy to selecting the
aerospace plane would be the initial attempts at building workable launch
vehicles and the Shuttle in which considerable difficulty was encountered
because no prior experience was available in many of the development areas
undertaken. The reference vehicles proposed for the SPS, however, use Shuttle
and Solar Electric Propulsion technology in which there should be twenty to
thirty years of experience by the time of the initial SPS. In the SPS
development time-frame the Shuttle and Solar Electric technologies will be
2-28
developed to the point where the effort will be one of scaling up existing
technology rather than proving new concepts. The SPS vehicles would then be
analogous to the Apollo-Saturn development. This program, while technically
difficult and expensive was able to use the skills, experience and success of
previous efforts in launch vehicles to achieve a phenomenal growth in
capability in less than ten years.
The entire NASA program with a sub-categorization of the manned
spaceflight program (excluding the shuttle) for the years 1959-1976 is given
in Table 2.4.1 and is usedlto illustrate several points. The main point
illustrated is that a comPlex program such as the manned spaceflight (MSF)
program was able to accomplish its goals within its cost targets. The Apollo
moon program was originally estimated at $20 to $40 billion (1960 dollars) or
$40 to $80 billion in 1977 dollars. The low end of this range was achieved
when NASA's R&D funding for the manned spaceflight program (including Apollo
predecessors) is considered ($25B). During this period, however, NASA was
conducting vigorous programs in many areas, and much of this activity
supported the manned program in addition to having its own goals. The R&D
funding should also be augmented by a major amount of the NASA Construction
($2.9 billion) and Research and Program management ($8.9 billion) expenditures
during this period, since the manned program was the immediate justification
for these expenditures. A predise allocation of these multi-purpose funds
would require a detailed study itself. By noting that slightly more than half
of NASA R&D funding was expended on MSF, however, the allocation of half of
these other funding is reasonable. When this amount ($5.9 billion) is added
to the $25 billion for direct MSF expenditures, the total is $31 billion or
slightly more than half of the total NASA expenditures during the period
1959-1976.
The next point illustrated is that the NASA program was vigorous and
multifaceted during the period of the Apollo program. In addition to the
major component of manned spaceflight, considerable effort, was expended in
other areas including automated missions, aircraft technology and a strong
generalized science and technology program. Much of this program indirectly,
if not directly, supported the manned program. The SPS program, a similarly
ambitious program, must also be supported in a similar manner. This type of
support is not included in the transportation cost estimates, nor in any
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TABLE 2.4.2 ORIGINAL SHUTTLE ESTIMATES
PROGRAM
ELEMENT
DDT&E
Facilities
Investment (Orbiters)
Flight Charge (1973)
Flight Charge (1976)+
Original 1977
Dollars (1973) Dollars
$ 5.150 B $ 7.081 B
$ 0.300 B $ 0.431 B
$ 1.000 B $ 1.375 B
$ 6.450 B $ 8.869 B
$10.45 M $14.37 M
$14.85 M $20.43 M
+ Originally $18 Million in 1975 dollars--see text for
discussion
adjustments we have suggested. It is noted that the total NASA expenditures
in the Apollo period (1959-1976) when adjusted for inflation to 1977 dollars
are $118 billion or approximately the current estimate of the cost of the SPS
through the first platform.
During the same period the cost for launch vehicles for the Apollo
program, including both vehicle and engine development was $9.8 billion or 38
percent of the Apollo program and 17 percent of the total program. Consider-
ing the differences between the two programs in terms of continuing use of the
vehicles, the SPS vehicle costs and the Apollo vehicle costs are approximately
the same percentage of program costs.
In contrast, the Shuttle Program, which is developing new technology,
such as reusable thermal protection systems and reusable engines which are al-
so required for use on the SPS vehicles, is being developed at a time when the
NASA budget is tightly constrained. Support for the Shuttle must be extracted
from other programs when trouble is encountered. Because of the technical ad-
vances which have yet to be completed, the Shuttle is behind schedule and con-
sequently is ahead of costs. The original estimate is shown in Table 2.4.2 in
the original 1973 dollars and as adjusted to 1977 dollars. Overruns are ex-
pected which are substantial in terms of absolute dollars but which may be on
the order of 20 percent of the total program when adjusted for inflation.
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We have not been able to determine the equivalent cost overruns for
the original, unmanned space launch vehicles, but expect overruns to have been
of this magnitude rather than larger, with one notable exception, the Centaur.
This cryogenic upper stage was a "first" and experienced significant problems
before ultimate success. The relatively low underruns in most of the vehicle
developments was due to several factors: (1) the space launch vehicles were
developed from ICBM boosters (Thor-Delta, Atlas-Centaur and Titan) and from
NASA sounding rockets (Scout). (2) development test flights were scheduled
into the program and most the failures occurred and the problems resolved in
this portion of the program. These vehicles also had initial and continuing
reliability problems which have been only partially overcome in the process of
extensive use, e.g., 151 flights for the Delta, the most frequently used
vehicle. The manned Shuttle, however, can be rated as a success only if no
serious accident occurs in the planned six development launches or in the
early operational phase.
In addition to the question of whether the SPS vehicles can be built
within reasonable cost estimates, there is a question of whether the current
vehicle technology can be scaled up to meet SPS requirements. Historical
experience is very positive in this area. The Apollo vehicles were designed
and built largely according to the original proposals from experience gained
with ICBM boosters. In addition, the Delta vehicle, which started out as an
ICBM derivative was uprated from a capacity of 45 kg (100 Ibs) to 954 kg
, ,,L U_J ,,,*v _ .........tc Ibs) +_ 'h_ _amp. reference orbit (Geosynchronous Transfer), a factor of
21 improvement in payload during a period of less than 20 years. The
progression in this design is illustrated in Figure 2.4.3. Progress toward
increasing the capacity of other designs has not been as dramatic, mostly
because the Delta was the vehicle with capability and cost desired by
commercial users for communications satellites. As inferred by the drawings,
the Delta has evolved significantly and this includes the replacement of all
engines and the guidance system.
An assessment of detailed Delta cost information(I0) indicates that
this growth in capability by a factor of 21 for the Delta has been accom:
plished with only modest growth in cost above that caused by inflation. The
costs of using all launch vehicles were revised in the mid-1970's as part
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DELTA DELTA DELTA DELTA DELTA DELTA
1960 A B C D E
45 kg 1962 1962 1963 1964 1965
(100 Ib) 68 kg 68 kg 82 kg 104 kg 150 kg
(150 Ib) (150 Ib) (180 Ib) (230 Ib) (330 Ib)
DELTA )ELTA )ELTA DELTA DELTA DELTA
M M-6 904 2914 3914 3910/PAM
1968 1969 1971 1972 1975 1980
356 kg 454 kg 635 kg 724 kg 954 kg 1154 kg
(785 Ib) (1,000 Ib) (1,400 Ib) (1,593 Ib) (2,100 Ib) (2544 Ib)
Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit Capability - ESMC
DELTA
J
_' 1968
263 kg
(580 tb)
1
)ELTA
3920/PAM
1982
1312 kg
(2,894 Ib)
FIGURE 2.4.3
SOURCE Reference. 8
DELTA LAUNCH VEHICLE GROWTH
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of a government wide policy change to collect prorated costs for facilities
and other investments which had not been collected previously. As a result,
'the Shuttle charge as well as those for expendable vehicles were revised
upward. The previous charges covered items which are analogous to the SPS
vehicle costs per flight while the new charges include the costs of launch
facilities and civil service salaries which are not in the SPSvehicle costs.
The development costs for increasing the payload capability are also
not directly included in the vehicle costs examined. Most have been paid
directly from the overall Delta budget line, and our estimate of these
expenditures is approximately 25 percent of the total expendedon the Delta
program. Charges after the mid-1970's, however, include an allocation for
developments subsequent to the policy change. Other vehicles such as the
Atlas, Titan and Scout have had payload capability growth in the sameperiod,
but this growth has not been as dramatic. This is due both to technical
reasons--they started from higher relative capabilities- and due to lack of
demandfor increasing the payload capacity above that which existed.
This discussion, then, indicates that substantial payload growth can
occur at reasonable cost and at a pace dictated by demand, here defined as a
willingness to invest for the capability.
This discussion addressed two questions of whether it is possible to
(1) develop the requisite capacity of the SPSvehicles and (2) within cost es-
timates. The conclusion drawn is that it is indeed possible under the con-
straint that the developments do not stretch technology availability. This is
not, of course, a guarantee that the SPSvehicles will be built within pre-
cisely defined cost limits, only an indication that it is possible. There
are, unfortunately, counter-examples of developments which met both of these
criteria and still had major overruns.
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2.5 Conclusions and Recommendations
2.5.1 Cost Uncertainty Estimate
The vehicle design and first unit costs estimated by the contractors
have been found to be reasonable in terms of the advancement in capabilities
and technology required. The designs selected, with the exception of the
EOTV, are extensions of current launch vehicle technology and thus have rel-
atively low uncertainties in relation to more ambitious designs. The un-
certainty associated with the Cost Estimating Relationship (CER) methodology
used for the Reference Vehicle cost estimates is in the range of 10 to 15
percent, and is typical of uncertainties in aerospace programs at this stage
of development. Because the cargo vehicles (HLLV and EOTV) require a sub-
stantial increase beyond current capacities, the statement that the uncertain-
ty lies within this range implies successful completion of the Shuttle and
Solar Electric Propulsion Stage programs under way or planned by NASA.
An alternative way of viewing the level of development uncertainty is
to consider the effect of an unanticipated and significant development problem
which is not revealed by the testing program until the design and initial
units well underway. The resolution of this problem within the same basic
design would likely take from 6 to 18 months and involve tens to hundreds of
millions depending upon the stage of progress when the problem was perceived.
Because designs are in many respects modular, some efforts can proceed and
others would be blocked; exactly which cannot be foreseen. The direct effect
of a $200 million extra expenditure to resolve a problem on the HLLV, for ex-
ample would be a two percent overrun on development. Because other activities
would be stalled during a period of high expenditures, the indirect effects
could cause a total overrun of one or two billion dollars or 10 to 20 percent.
This level of overrun, while large in terms of absolute dollar amounts, is the
uncertainty inherent at this stage of program planning. In the case of the
other chemical propulsion vehicles, both the design efforts and development
problems are expected to result in lower dollar amounts but the effects of any
significant problem would have a similar percentage impact. The EOTV, sharing
many of the same components of the SPS platform, and required to be available
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earlier, is expected to have a larger uncertainty. Because of this uncertain-
ty at this stage of the program, it is expected that research efforts will be
directed toward reducing that uncertainty so that fat the time a commitment is
made, there will be information and design experience establishing approxi-
mately the same level of uncertainty as for the ch_emical propulsion vehicles.
At this time, however, the EOTV has a larger uncertainty due to untested tech-
nology. Because of the potential problems of an untried and tested technolo-
gy, specifically large space structures, uncertainty statements in this area
are necessarily subjective, until experience is available for more explicit
compari sons.
2.5.2 Reliability Assumption Impact
The SPS program costs for transportation are based on an ambitious
scenario which assumes 100 percent reliability for the vehicles. The use of
this 100 percent reliability assumption is considered to be appropriate only
!
for initial planning and program sizing calculations and must be supplemented
by a thorough assessment of the problems which can occur when space vehicles
have major accidents. A preliminary examination of these problems indicates
that additional vehicles are required to assure the ability to meet the
proposed construction rate of two 5 Gigawatt platforms per year. An increase
in investment costs of about 10 percent would allow purchase and use of
reasonable number of additional vehicles. The exact level of increase depends
upon a determination of acceptable program risks and the consequences of
specific events or accidents. Accordingly, we make two recommendations in
this area:
(I)
(2)
The cost estimates for space transportation should be increased
to reflect additional costs of having reserve vehicles on hand.
The exact level of reserve vehicles should be determined as part
of revisions to the SPS operating and cost plan. The plan
should specify the potential risks and determine reasonable re-
sponses to those risks to maintain SPS construction schedules in
the event of the likely disruptions in transport capibility.
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The special development of the Personnel Launch Vehicle (PLV), and
specifically the booster, for use in the SPS is questioned. The use of a per-
sonnel module aboard the HLLV, if acceptable for safety, would avoid a de-
velopment expense and have about the same recurring cost per flight as the
HLLV. The development money could then be spent later, an important program-
matic and economic consideration, for additional HLLV's and provide some of
the reserve vehicles needed to assure launching capability in the event of
accidents or other disruptions. The concept of a small cargo/personnel car-
rier is, however, considered valid. Adaptation of the then existing Space
Shuttle should be considered for initial testing of SPS components and sub-
systems and for unusual cargos which may appear as the SPS program becomes
more precisely defined. The major reason for questioning the additional
development of the PLV booster is that it results in significant additional
costs without resulting in a subsequent cost savings and at the same time has
no clearly defined role which cannot also be performed by the HLLV.
2.5.3 Major Source of Uncertainty IEOTV)
The EOTV has the highest cost uncertainty because experience in many
of the technologies is not as advanced as in the other vehicles. Most of the
relevant technologies in propulsion are well along in development and should
be thoroughly understood when NASA develops and flies, as planned, a Solar
Electric Propulsion Stage. The remaining major technological problems are
photovoltaic cells and large space structures. Both of these are key tech-
nologies for both the SPS platforms as well as the EOTV. Solar cell tech-
nology will be pursued for terrestrial energy conversion purposes and thus is
very likely to produce a technology and manufacturing infrastructure which can
be adapted to SPS platform and/or EOTV use almost independently of the SPS
program. The SPS program will have to develop the light-weight spaceworthy
cell and assure production capability of approximately 72 acres per day (if
Silicon is chosen). In an area where significant non-governmental _nterest
has already been shown, this is considered a manageable if demanding task.
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Space structures, however, are being pursued only by NASAand the major demand
in the near-term is likely to come from NASA-engenderedprograms and the SPS
program. In comparison with photovoltaic cells, little work has been done in
large space structures and there is no operational experience. Accordingly,
the costs as well as the technology is highly uncertain and this is identified
as an area requiring extensive efforts if SPSis to succeed. There is, how-
ever, no reason to believe that the EOTVpresents any problem that would not
also be encountered with the SPSpower platform. Thus the EOTVcost uncer-
tainty is approximately that of the SPSplatform and muchhigher than that of
the other transport components. For purposes of calculating an overall
program uncertainty, the values - 15 to I00 percent are assigned, if other
studies of the SPSplatform indicate higher (or lower) uncertainty, that value
can reasonably be used in place of ours.
There is another potential problem associated with the EOTVcost
estimates; that of using the average unit cost for the EOTVsas being the rep-
resentative cost. For other vehicles the initial production run can carry the
production cost down to the point where the actual cost approximates the aver-
age unit cost. For the EOTV, however, the ability to make this rapid progress
is much more uncertain. Many of the components have projected learning cost
reductions which are dependent upon the demand for SPS platform components in
addition to the demand for their use on the EOTV. If the full production
rates for these components are not achieved in a timely manner, the costs for
the EOTV can be severely distorted. If the production rate goals are initial-
ly missed, but ultimately achieved, this would result in a significant delay
in achieving the expected EOTV average unit cost. Accordingly, further study
to determine and document the likely path of EOTV costs is recommended.
2.5.4 High Labor Leaverage on Space Transportation
SPS vehicle costs have been stated in terms of dollars per flight
based on an expected life of the vehicle and expected refurbishment labor
hours and rates. Only the fuel costs (15 percent of the cost of the HLLV, for
example) do not have a significant, recurring labor component. While the
underlying cost estimates are based on labor estimating relations which have
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been translated into dollars, it is all too easy to disassociate the dollar
estimates from the underlying manpower requirements. The estimates made for
all aspects of the program assure that the imputed labor levels are high. The
labor cost leverage on the SPS vehicles is accordingly very high and mis-
estimates of the labor requirements or the real rates of that labor will carry
through to the transportation costs directly and proportionately.
There is no evidence that the labor and resulting costs are incor-
rectly made. The Shuttle program, however, which was to have been operational
at this point in time when the SPS vehicle estimates were made, and thus pro-
vide confirmatory information for the SPS estimates, is delayed by development
problems. The labor estimates for vehicle refurbishment must therefore be
regarded as planning estimates, unconfirmed by directly applicable experience.
The uncertainty in the refurbishment estimates for the SPS vehicles is ac-
cordingly high. The goal of near-term SPS vehicle investigation efforts
should be to reduce both the refurbishment labor requirements and the
uncertainty associated with them.
2.5.5 General Assessment
The space transportation designs and their cost estimates reflect an
early stage of program evolution. Considerable effort has been directed
toward making the designs and their cost estimates the best that can be
achieved at this point in time with limited funding and with the goal of pro-
viding a complete and complex system which can be available by the year 2000.
The effort has largely been successful and most of the remaining problems in
cost estimation which can be addressed by analysis (rather than development)
are considered to have a relatively small impact on the transportation cost
estimates. The major exception to this statement is the general problem of
safety and vehicle reliability and the impacts of these matters on plans and
costs. This problem should be explicitly addressed in the early future and
the projected costs of overcoming plausible misfortunes should be included in
future cost studies. It is acknowledged that to consider these problems in
the first program estimates to receive broad public exposure would require a
large number of assumptions which can engender controversy on their own.
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Accordingly deferral of the problem to the near future is reasonable, but
acknowledgmentof the problem at this time is needed to provide credibility
for all program cost estimates as the transportation costs are recognized as a
cost driver of the SPSprogram. This report has indicated someof these cost
impacts and it is hoped that these estimates will be useful until replaced by
better ones.
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3.0 REVIEWOFVEHICLECONCEPTSANDPERFORMANCE
A brief technical evaluation of the SPSTransportation System was
conducted to provide insight into the difficulty of development programs
planned, and to aid in the evaluation of cost allocations. The evaluation
consisted of three main activities: (1) Comparisonof transportation system
weights with present systems and designs to determine whether or not the pro-
jected weights can reasonably be expected to be achieved; (2) Identification
and assessmentof the level of technology required for major vehicle hardware
elements (e.g. rocket engines); and (3)Analysis of vehicle mission perfor-
manceto verify that the vehicles as defined by the contractors would produce
the performance quoted.
3.1 Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle (HLLV) Concepts and Cost Impacts
3.1.1 Boein 9 HLLV
The Boeing HLLV concept is shown in Figure 3.1.1. It is a winged,
two stage series-burn configuration designed for vertical take-off and
horizontal landing (VTOHL). Both stages are fully reusable. The booster
(first stage) uses 16 Liquid Oxygen/Liquid Methane engines. The orbiter uses
14 Liquid Oxygen/Liquid Hydrogen Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs). An
airbreather propulsion system has been provided on the booster for _IL_^_,,juQ__v
the launch site. The orbiter has four LO2/LH 2 orbital maneuvering system
(OMS) engines for orbit transfers, rendezvous maneuvers, and de-orbit for the
return flight.
3.1.1.1 Boein 9 HLLV Weights. A weight statement for the Boeing HLLV
is given with Figure 3.1.1. As shown, the vehicle gross liftoff weight (GLOW)
is 10,978,400 kg (including a 424,000 kg payload). Booster liftoff weight
(BLOW) is 7,813,700 kg and orbiter liftoff weight (OLOW) without payload is
2,740,700 kg.
For any rocket stage the key parameter that is a measure _)f design
efficiency from the standpoint of weights is the mass fraction. Mass fraction
is the ratio of propellant (fuel + oxidizer) weight to total stage weight.
Two-StageWingedVehicle Design Characteristics
GLOW
BLOW
BOOSTERFUEL(LCH4!
BOOSTEROXIDIZER (L02)
BOOSTERINERTS
OLOW-LESSPAYLOAD
ORBITERFUEL(LH2)
ORBITEROXIDIZER(L02)
ORBITERINERTS
ASCENTPAYLOAD
RETURNPAYLOAD15%
MASSFRACTION
ENTRYWEIGHT-NOPAYLOAD
-WITH RETURNP/L
STARTCRUISEWEIGHT-NOP/L
-WITHRETURNP/L
LANDINGWEIGHT-NOPAYLOAD
-WITHRETURNP/L
ORBITER
m
2,740,700
329,4001P,
1,976,2oo;
435,100"
424,000
63,500
0.841
395,200
456,000
i
391,800
452,600
I0,978,400
BOOSTER
7,813,700
1,708,900
5,126,700
978,100
m
n
D
0.875
936,600
932,900
846,700
*MAINSTAGE + FLIGHT PERFORMANCE RESERVE
(ALL MASS DATA IN kg)
FIGURE,'3.1.1 BOEING HLLV DRAWING AND MASS STATEMENT
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Thus, for the HLLVorbiter, the mass fraction is:
329,400 + 1,976,200 = 0.84.
2,740,700
The mass fraction for the booster is 0.87.
These values were compared to the mass fraction of the present
Shuttle Orbiter which is similar in design to the HLLV. However, unlike the
HLLV, the Shuttle carries most of its LH2/LO 2 propellants in an external
tank (ET) attached to the belly of the orbiter (see Figure 3.2.1). HLLV
tankage is internal. The Shuttle mass fraction was calculated based on the
Orbiter/ET combination and its value is 0.87.
The HLLV Orbiter mass fraction is less than that of the Shuttle be-
cause the integral tankage leads to a much larger orbiter vehicle than would
otherwise be required. The disposable tank design of the Shuttle saves
weight. The HLLV mass fraction is the same as the Shuttle even though the
booster also has internal tankage. The improved mass fraction occurs for
several reasons: (1) economies of scale--the booster is several times the
size of the Shuttle, (2) the booster fuel (methane) is much more dense than
hydrogen leading to reduced tank size, and (3) the booster is not exposed to
reentry conditions so that thermal protection requirements and weights are
less.
The conclusion resulting from the above discussions is that the
Boeing HLLV mass fractions appear reasonab|e based on present experience, and
should be achievable in the 1990-2000 time frame. Internal tankage is expect-
ed to save costs at very high use rates associated with the SPS.
3.1.1.2 Boein 9 HLLV Level of Technology.
Airframe
The previous discussion of weights indicates that weight allocations
for airframe elements is adequate. The structural materials specified (7075-
T73 titanium, 7075 aluminum, etc) are standard materials currently available.
The only major potential problems identified are in the thermal insulation
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required for the HLLV orbiter. First, the vehicle thermal protection system
(TPS) basically is the same as for the current Shuttle, i.e. externally ap-
plied Silica tiles. The Shuttle system is currently experiencing flight
qualification problems that could lead to an increase of up to 20% in tile
system weight. The question then arises as to whether the HLLV orbiter weight
allocation for the tile system is adequate. Upon examination of the data, it
is. The _action of the HLLV orbiter inert weight allocated to thermal pro-
tection is 0.12. The corresponding fraction for the Shuttle is 0.10. There-
fore the HLLV allocation in this cursory analysis appears to be adequate.
A second problem arises from the need to insulate the orbiter liquid
hydrogen and liquid oxygen propellant tanks. In the case of Shuttle, propel-
lants are carried in the separable External Tank (ET--see Figure 3.2.1), which
is expended on each _ight. The Shuttle and all other launch vehicles to date
have used expendable tank insulation or insulation that might be reused a max-
imum of 10 or so times*. A significant development effort may be required for
an insulation system that would be reusable, with little or no maintenance,
for the life of the orbiter*.
Engines
The 02/H2 engines for the HLLV orbiter are, as noted previously,
the same as those developed for the present Space Shuttle (the SSME). As such
they represent off-the-shelf hardware and should present no significant devel-
opmental problems.
The 02/CH 4 booster engines represent significant increase in peF-
formance over present engines using hydrocarbon fuels. The key measure of
rocket engine performance is specific impulse (Isp) which is defined as the
engine thrust foFce divided by the total weight _ ow rate of all propellants
and is measured with units of seconds. The Isp projected for the Boeing HLLV
booster engine is 352 seconds. The highest Isp for comparable engines pro-
duced to date is 305 seconds for the F-I on the Saturn V Booster (Apollo
Program). However, the F-1 was designed some 20 years ago and no new engines
*T/C with G. Woodcock, Boeing Aerospace
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of this type have been developed since. For the HLLV engines, the 352 second
Isp would be achieved by using SSME technology. High speed pumps would be
used to produce an approximately 3-fold increase in engine chamber pressure.
That pressure increase, when coupled with a high expansion ratio nozzle, will
produce the desired performance increase. No new technology development is
needed, but a complete engine development and test program will be required.
One area of possible concern is the reliability of the large cluster
of engines used on both the booster and the orbiter. The booster uses 16
engines, and the orbiter 14. For a completely successful launch 30 engines
must function correctly. If it is assumed that the reliability of individual
booster and orbiter engines is the same, then the reliability of the HLLV
propulsion systems (probability that all 30 engines will operate successfully)
is the reliability of an individual engine raised to the 30th power. Now the
reliability of engines on NASA launches historically has been 0.99 or better.
The Delta/Thor MB-3 engine has posted a record of 144 launches without a
single failure. Assuming limits of 0.99 and 0.9999 for an individual engine
reliability range then overall propulsion system reliability becomes:
Engine Propulsion System
Reliabilit_ Reliabilit_
0.99 0.74
0.999 0.97
0.9999 0.997
These results illustrate the point that high system reliability re-
quires very high engine reliability. Fo achieve 0.99 propulsion system reli-
ability would require 0.9996 engine reliability. If this very high engine
reliability is not achieved then it will be necessary to cope with occasional
engine failure conditions by adjustments in engine design and flight opera-
tions. First the engines must be designed so that failures do not produce
catastrophic results, but rather only an "engine out" condition. Second, the
loss in performance due to engine out conditions must be factored into payload
delivery planning. If the vehicle design full payload is carried then "engine
out" occurrences could necessitate mission aborts. Alternatively, the number
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of aborts required could be minimized if payload were reduced and/or if pay-
load scheduling were tailored to alleviate the problem. Present scheduling
calls for a numberof the HLLVflights to carry 02/H2 propellants to or-
bit for use in the Personnel Orbit Transfer Vehicle (POTV)and for other uses.
If instead of using scheduled flights for this purpose, a quantity of
02/H2 for the POTVwere carried on each flight, then this propellant might
be available to the HLLVin "engine out" situations to eliminate the need for
manymission aborts. Using this strategy the HLLVfull design payload could
be carried, but a portion of each payload would be POTVpropellants. If this
strategy were adopted it would generate a need for long-term (up to months)
storage of 02/H2 propellants. The difficulty and cost of accomplishing
this would have to be weighed against the advantages accrued to HLLVopera-
tions. Performance calculations indicate that if the payload is reduced
approximately 10 percent and the fuel load is as stated, the HLLVwould reach
the desired orbit if one engine on each stage had to be shut down. If the
mission were entirely successful, the fuels could be stored in orbit for
orbital use.
3.1.1.3 Boeing HLLV Performance.
The performance of the Boeing HLLV was evaluated using Battelle's
launch vehicle performance analysis computer program. Results agreed with
those of Boeing (424,000 Kg delivered to a 477 Km orbit at 31 °) to within 5
percent. The difference is believed to be a result of our approximations used
to expedite analysis and not to a deficiency in the vehicle specifications.
Thus, given the present design, the Boeing HLLV should be able to deliver the
quoted performance.
Previous discussions have revealed circumstances which could lead to
reduced performance. First, the booster requires development of a new engine
exhibiting a significant increase in specific impulse over similar existing
engines. Second, the use of a total of a 30 engines increases the possibility
of having to operate with one more engines out on some flights. The impact of
these considerations on HLLV performance was evaluated. Booster engine Isp is
listed at 352 seconds, where_s only 305 seconds has been achieved with present
engines of that type. HLLV performance at an intermediate booster Isp of 340
seconds was determined and found to be approximately 400,000 Kg delivered to
orbit, 6 percent lower than the nominal 424,000 Kg.
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With regard to the engine out condition three cases were examined (1)
one booster engine out, (2) one orbiter engine out, and (3) two engines out
(one booster, one orbiter). The results are shown in Table 3.1.2.
TABLE 3.1.2 ENGINE OUT PERFORMANCE PENALTY (Boeing HLLV)
Payload Percent
Number of Delivered Payload
Engines Out (kg) Reduction
None 424,000 -
One Booster 396,000 7
One Orbiter 412,000 3
One Booster and
One Orbiter 386,000 9
3.1.2 Rockwell HLLV
The Rockwell HLLV concept is shown in Figure 3.1.3. It is a winged,
two-stage, parallel burn configuration designed for vertical take-off and hor-
izontal landing (VTOHL). Both stages are fully reusable. The booster has 7
Lox/RP-I engines that operate on a gas generator cycle. The orbiter has 4
Lox/Hydrogen engines. An air breather propulsion system is installed in the
booster for flyback to the launch site. The orbiter maneuvering propulsion
system was -^+ _+_
The Rockwell concept differs from the Boeing concept in a number of
ways. It is a much smaller vehicle that delivers only a little more than half
the payload (227,000 Kg versus 424,000 Kg) to orbit. It is a parallel burn
(both stages ignited on the pad) configuration, whereas the Boeing HLLV is
series burn. The Rockwell vehicle uses fewer but larger engines. The orbiter
engines are significantly larger (twice the thrust) than the Boeing engines
(which were standard SSMEs).
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3.1.2.1 Rockwell HLLV Weights
Rockwell HLLV inert weights are summarized in Figure 3.1.3 together
with propellant requirements. One feature of the Rockwell HLLV is that part
Of the orbiter propellants are carried in the booster and crossfed to the
orbiter engines during _ight. This reduces the tankage requirement for the
orbiter stage. The crossfed propellants are identified in Figure 3.1.3.
Gross liftoff weight of the Rockwell HLLV is 7,140,000 kg, about 30 percent
less than the Boeing vehicle.
Booster and orbiter mass fractions are 0.88 and 0.81 respectively.
These compare favorably with the Shuttle mass fraction of 0.87 defined in
3.1.1.1 and should be achievable in the 1990's.
3.1.2.2 Rockwell HLLV Level of Technology
Air Frame
Material requirements for the Rockwell concept should be no more de-
manding than those for the Boeing concept. As with the Boeing vehicle, the
possible concerns are with the orbiter thermal protection system (TPS) and re-
usable propellant tank insulation (see 3.1.1.2). The TPS weight allocation
appears adequate. The fraction of orbiter inert weight devoted to TPS is
0.18, compared to 0.10 for the Space Shuttle.
Enqines
Both the booster and orbiter engines represent new developments. The
orbiter engines are conceptually similar to the SSME, and, for the most part,
reflect SSME level technology. However, they are much larger and operate at a
higher Isp (467 sec versus 455 sec). To produce the higher Isp in an engine
that must operate in conditions ranging from sea level to vacuum may require
some new technology (e.g., a variable geometry nozzle).
The booster engine concept is similar to that for Boeing. It is a
high chamber pressure, high Isp (352 seconds) hydrocarbon fueled engine. The
fuel used is RP-1 (which is very similar to kerosene). Development of the
engine should require no new technology and present no special problems above
those for the Boeing engine.
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The engine reliability question is substantially different for the
Rockwell HLLV than the Boeing vehicle. A total of 11 engines are required
compared to 30 for the Boeing concept. Thus, individual engine reliability is
less critical to overall propulsion system reliability. Assuming limits of
0.99 and 0.9999 for individual engine reliability, overall propulsion system
reliability becomes:
Engine
Reliability
Propulsion System
Reliability
0.99 0.90
0.999 0.99
0.9999 0.999
Thus, 0.99 propulsion system reliability can be achieved with 0.999
engine reliability, a level not far above that demonstrated with current en-
gines. Hence, the smaller vehicle with fewer engines considerably alleviates
the system reliability problem. However, it should be pointed out that de-
pendence on fewer, larger engines will produce larger impacts on performance
when an "engine out" situation does occur, and safe and successful operations
will require that the engines be designed so that failures are not
catastrophic.
3.1.2.3 Rockwell HLLV Performance. Performance of the Rockwell HLLV
is quoted as 227,000 kg to a 487 km orbit at 31.6 degrees inclination. Based
on the present vehicle specifications, Battelle's performance analysis agrees
with that result.
Performance of the Rockwell concept is dependent on achieving a sig-
nificant gain in booster Isp from present levels of around 300 seconds (for
that type of engine) to 352 seconds. The effect of an arbitrary shortfall of
12 seconds in Isp was analyzed. At 340 seconds booster Isp, the HLLV payload
is reduced 7 percent to approximately 210,000 Kg. Examination of engine out
conditions demonstrates that, as should be expected the performance of a
vehicle with fewer larger engines is penalized more when one or more of those
engines _ils to function. Results of the analysis are summarized inTable
3.1.4. The strategy for use of the Rockwell HLLV would probably be to design
for high reliability and abort those few _ight where an engine out situation
OCCUFS.
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The Rockwell parallel-burn concept has never been implemented and this
represents a slightly higher level of technical uncertainty than for the
Boeing design. The cost uncertainty is therefore slightly higher.
TABLE 3.1.4 ENGINE OUT PERFORMANCEPENALTY (Rockwell HLLV)
Payload Percent
Deli vered Payload
Engines Out (kg) Reduction
None 227,000 -
One Booster 198,000 13
One Orbiter 181,000 20
One Booster and
One Orbiter * *
3.2 Personnel Launch Vehicle (PLV) Concep%s and Cost Impacts
3.2.1 PLV Technical Assessment
The Personnel Launch Vehicle (PLV) is used to transport personnel and
priority cargo to Low Earth Orbit (LEO). The PLV is an evolutionary deriva-
tion of the Space Shuttle. The vehicle consists of a winged liquid propellant
fly back booster that uses four Oxygen/Methane engines*similar to the Boeing
Idrl_ J, ommuHLLV booster engines, a smaller version of the Shuttle External _c
the Space Shuttle Orbiter. The PLV is shown in Figure 3.2.1.
Since the PLV orbiter is the Shuttle orbiter it presents no techno-
logical or developmental problems. The booster uses technology very similar
to the HLLV booster and therefore presents no problems not previously ad-
dressed in the HLLV discussion. For the HLLV booster only two potential
problems were identified: the reliability of multiple engine systems and a
possible shortfall in engine performance (inability to achieve the full Isp
increase to 352 seconds).
* Loss of two engines produces low liftoff thrust-to-weight ratio (1.14).
Abort would probably be required; if not, the performance penalty would be
unacceptably large.
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FLYBACK BOOSTER MASS SUMMARY
Item
Wings
Tail
Body
Induced Envlr. Protect.
Landing & Aux. Systems
Propulsion - Ascent
Propulsion- RCS
Propulsion - Flyback
Prime Power
Elect, Cony. and Dist.
Hydr. Cony. and Dist.
Surface Control s
Avionics
Envi ron,mntal Control
Growth All owance
Dry Mass
Residuals and Reserves
Landing Mass
Flyback Fuel
Infl ight Losses
Inert Mass
Mass (Kg]
31,940
4,930
68,490
9,050
9.710
51,320
960
13,800
l,190
960
4,320
2,020
l,450
210
16_200
(216,460)
12,700
(229,160)
26,260
3,900
(259,320)
ORBITER/ET MASS SUMMARY
Item
Structures
Thermal Protection
Propulsion & Mech. Syst
Electrical System
Orbiter Attachments
Change Uncertanty
ET Inert Mass
Unusables
ET Meco Mass
Orbiter I03 Prelaunch
Mass w/o Payload
Orbiter/ET Inert Mass
FIGURE 3.2.1 PLV DRAWING AND INERT MASS STATEMENT
Mass (Kg)
21,146
l,631
l,710
66
l,492
686
(26,731)
1,530
(28,261)
91,605
(119,866)
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The PLV booster has only 4 engines (The HLLV booster has 16) and con-
sequently the reliability concern is greatly reduced. The effect of any small
to moderate engine performance shortfall could probably be accommodated by
increasing propellant capacity if necessary, in the external tank. The major
source of uncertainty for costs lies with the booster development costs, and
the integration of the Shuttle with the booster.
3.3 Cargo Orbit Transfer Vehicle (EOTV) Concepts and Cost Impacts
3.3.1 Boeing EOTV
The Boeing Cargo (Electric) Orbit Transfer Vehicle (EOTV) concept is
shown in Figure 3.3.1. The EOTV is an electric propulsion vehicle used to
transport satellite components from the LEO staging depot to the GEO construc-
tion base. It consists of a solar array, a payload mounting and docking plat-
form, and ion thruster modules at the four corners of the vehicle. The EOTV
is designed to be fully reusable with servicing between flights. The Rockwell
EOTV is conceptually similar to the Boeing design. Both are portions of an
SPS platform delivering power to ion engines instead of a microwave antenna.
3.3.1.1 Boeing EOTV Weights. Boeing EOTV weights are summarized in
Figure 3-6. One of the key parameters of interest in evaluating electric ve-
hicle design efficiency is the power generation specific mass. That specific
mass is defined as the ratio of power generated in watts to power generation
system mass (kg). Presently achievable values are in the 60-200 range. The
EOTV design generates 4206 MW power, so its power generation specific mass is:
specific mass =
206,000,000
951,000
= 216 w/kg
This value is stretching present technology, but considering lead
time available and economics of scale, it should be achievable.
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FIGURE 3.3.1 EOTV DRAWING AND MASS STATEMENT
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3.3.1.2 Boein 9 EOTV Level of Technology. There are a number of
issues concerning the technology required to develop the EOTV. These include:
on-orbit fabrication and system assembly, restoration of solar cells damaged
by Van Allen Belt radiation, orbital collision hazards, thruster scale-up, and
thruster lifetime. These issues are discussed briefly below.
The question of fabrication and assembly is one that is shared with
the Solar Power Satellite itself. In both cases, the technology required must
yet be demonstrated and is key to the entire SPS concept.
The silicon solar cells used to generate power will be significantly
damaged (up to 40% power loss) as the EOTV passes through the Van A11en radia-
tion belts. Most of the damage is probably repairable using a laser annealing
device incorporated into the system; however, the operational concept
represents advanced technology--its effectiveness and workability will have to
be proven in the development program. The Rockwell GaAIAs solar cells on
their EOTV would have a definate advantage in self annealing at operating
t emperat ures.
The EOTV will have a cross sectional area of 1.6 million square
meters. As it travels between LEO and GEO it will be exposed to the hazard of
collision with the orbiting objects (active and inactive satellites, and
debris). A specific analysis of this problem was not performed, but some in-
dication of the magnitude of the hazard can be derived from previous studies.
In 1977, NASA was considering the development of a lightweight "Solar
Sail" that would use I'-_,_,,_v,_,e to provide_ propulsion, for interplanetary
and Earth orbital space missions.[6] The cross sectional area of the sail was
625,000 m2, a little over a third the area of the EOTV. The orbital
collision hazard for Solar Sail LEO to GEO missions was evaluated and the
probability of a collision was found to be 0.1 per mission. However, when the
size of objects encountered (many are very small) was considered along with
the ability of the sail to survive collisions, the probability of successful
passage to GEO was estimated at 0.977.
[6] Haglund, et. al., "Solar Sail Technology Readiness Report," NASA Jet
Propulsion Laboratory, July 18, 1977.
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Since the EOTV is significantly larger than the sail and the mission
profiles are similar (but not the same)* it can be expected that the probabil-
ity of collisions with the EOTV is 0.1 - 0.3 or greater. Because the EOTV is
based at a lower altitude (470 km) than the sail (1200 km) and debris hazards
are significantly higher at lower altitudes, the EOTV hazard could be much
greater than the sail hazard. Given that the EOTV planned lifetime is 10
missions, the probability of damage is high. This entire problem area needs
to be examined to determine its effect on the operations and cost. Also the
inverse problem needs to be considered--potential damage inflicted on active
spacecraft by the EOTV. Debris removal and its associated costs have not been
considered in either the SPS Reference System or in this study.
The EOTV thrust is to be provided by 120 cm ion engines. Current
NASA ion engine technology is based on 30 cm engines. Consequently, there
arises a question as to how difficult the scale-up to 120 cm might be. In the
1960's a 150 cm engine was built and initially tested by NASA.** Although the
engine had life limiting features, it is expected that the extension of current
technology (scaling) would provide performance and lifetimes equivalent to the
current 30 cm engines. The ion engines are to last the life of the vehicle
(10 missions). However, certain engine components (the ion acceleration grids
and perhaps the cathode) must be replaced after each round-trip mission.
Reliable operation should be achievable if these refurbishment operations are
per formed.
3.3.1.3 Boeing EOTV Performance. Boeing EOTV performance was evalu-
ated using a low-thrust vehicle performance approximation algorithm.*** The
* Sail mission begins at 1200 km and reaches GEO in 250 days; COTV mission
begins at 470 km and reaches GEO in 180 days.
** At that time NASA was considering a manned Mars mission that would use the
larger thruster.
*** Fischer, N. H. and Tischer, A. E., "Study of Multimission Modular
Spacecraft (MMS) Propulsion Requirements," NASA Contract NAS7-786,
Battelle Columbus Laboratories, August 8, 1977.
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results indicate that for the reference 4,000,000 kg payload to GEO, the 180-
dayflight time quoted by Boeing is reasonable (Battelle's estimate is 170-200
days). The Boeing quote of a 40-day return flight to LEO with a 200,000 kg
payload is also reasonable (Battelle's estimate is 40-45 days).
As noted in section 3.3.1.1, the achievement of a 216 watts/kilogram
specific mass for the power generation system may be difficult. If a lower
value is obtained then a performance penalty will result. If a specific mass
of 150 is achieved instead of 216, then vehicle hardware mass will increase
400,000 kg. This would necessitate reducing the upbound payload by 400,000 kg
(a 10% reduction), or the payload could be held constant if flight time were
increased approximately 7 percent to 193 days.
3.4 Personnel Orbit Transfer VehicleConcept and Cost Impacts
The Personnel Orbit Transfer Vehicle (POTV) is shown in Figure 3.4.1
It is a single-stage ,n_,,u^LvZIL..L vehicle designed to transport personnel and
priority cargo from LEO to GEO. Propulsion would be provided by five 19,800
pound (88,000 newtons) thrust staged-combustion engines that would operate at
an Isp of 470 seconds. The POTV would be capable of transporting a 90,000 kg
payload from LEO to GEO. The entire vehicle propellant load would be used on
the up-bound trip. The vehicle would then be refueled in GEO with propellant
delivered by the EOTV. The EOTV is reasonably viewed as being more efficient
at fuel transportation than any chemically propelled vehicle such as the POTV.
3.4.1 POTV Weights
Figure 3.4.1 provides a POTV mass statement. Based on that data the
POTV total mass is 216,000 kg and its propellant mass fraction is 0.94. To
determine if0.94 is a reasonable value for the POTV, the mass fractions of
NASA's current Centaur stage (an 02/H 2 orbit transfer stage), a proposed
growth version of that stage (the Reusable Large Tank Centaur, or RLTC) and
the Apollo/S-IVB/IU and S-II were used for comparison. The Centaur is a
16,000 kg 02/H 2 stage with a mass fraction of 0.86. The RLTC is a 25,000
kg stage with a mass function of 0.90. The comparison is as summarized in
Table 3.4.2.
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_" Orbital Personnel
POTV Module
(80 passengers)
NOTE: Personnel Module Costs NOT in POTV Costs
POTV MASS STATEMENT
Item Mass (kg)
Structure and Mechanisms 6,900
Main Propulsion 2,500
Auxiliary Propulsion 500
Avionics 300
Electric Power System 450
Thermal Control 1,030
Contingency (15%) 1,750
]3,430
Payload 90,000
Total Propellant and Fuel Cell Fuel 203,000
Total Start Burn Mass
i ,,
216.5 MT
FIGURE 3.4.1 POTV DRAWING AND MASS STATEMENT
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TABLE 3.4.2 POTV MASS FRACTION COMPARISON WITH
LOX/LIQUID HYDROGEN STAGES
Stage
Mass Mass
Stage (kg) Fraction
Centaur 16,000 0.86
RLTC 25,000 0.90
S-IVB/IU 119,655 0.87
POTV 216,000 0.94
S-II 497,509 0.90
A mass fraction of 0.94 would appear to be somewhat optimistic based
on historical values. However, these are 1960's designs and the size of the
POTV brings in an economy of scale factor that may make 0.94 reasonable.
3.4.2 POTV Level of Technology
The POTV represents only a moderate step forward in design from
present vehicles. The engines are based on Shuttle engine (SSME) technology.
As noted in 3.4.1, the improvement in mass fraction to 0.94 represents some-
what of a challenge, but it is not an unreasonable goal for a vehicle of that
size in the 1990's. However, the on orbit handling and storage requirement of
POTV 02/H 2 propellants may be cause for concern.
The present operational concept assumes the POTV would be refueled in
GEO. The GEO propellant supply would be maintained by carrying propellant to
GEO with the EOTV. Oxygen and Hydrogen propellants are cryogenic and diffi-
cult to store for any extended period. The EOTV will require 180 days to
transport its propellants to GEO, to which must be added the GEO storage time.
Active cooling of the propellants will have to be provided on the EOTV and in
GEO. The availability of abundant power will help to resolve this problem but
the cooling equipment must be counted as part of the EOTV payload. This level
of detail has not been addressed in the SPS delivery scenario.
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3.4.3 POTV Performance
POTV perfomance was evaluated for the LEO to GEO mission assuming
the specified stage weights and engine performance (Isp = 470 seconds) would
be achieved. The analysis results are tentative since the weight statement
(Figure 3.4.1) does not identify what portion of "Total Propellant and Fuel
Cell Fuel" is allocated for 02/H2 main stage propellants. If approxi-
mately 93 - 95 percent of those propellants are 02/H 2 main stage propel-
lants then the quoted performance of 90,000 delivered to GEO is reasonable.
3.5 Utility/Intraorbital Transfer Vehicles
These vehicles are not included in the SPS Reference System Transpor-
tation Subsystem and accordingly have not been reviewed in detail. The area
of orbital operations has not been defined to provide the level of infomation
needed to make the same type of investigation and judgements as has been done
for the transport vehicles.
At least three different intraorbital vehicles have been proposed for
orbital operations:
(1) A large maintenance/supply tFansport vehicle. The POTV has been
suggested for the mission and the POTV performance appears
appropriate. There is some concern, however, that the long
potential duration of the SPS maintenance missions may require
some modifications to the fuel system and engines such that the
POTV and the large IOTV are not truly interchangeable.
(2) A medium to small stage to transfer and maneuver HLLV payloads
at LEO and GEO. A small vehicle using POTV technology has been
proposed and briery illustrated.
(3) A small vehicle to transport a few (1 to 5) people to and from
short-duration tasks has been illustrated but not described
technically.
While these vehicles are not part of the transportation category in
the WBS, and the costs during the life of the SPS will be miniscule in com-
parision to Earth-to-LEO vehicles, their costs in absolute terms will be in
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the hundreds of millions per year. They will also require servicing and place
a demandon orbital vehicle maintenance facilities.
3.6 Launch+ Recover_ and Refurbishment Facilities
The ground based vehicle service facilities appear to have been ade-
quately covered in parametric estimates and reasonably and appropriately
costed. Since these facilities and manpower requirements have not been
documented by specific designs and staffing plans, it is difficult to provide
a definitive assessment of their accuracy and certainty. Major facilities
required to service the vehicles have been indicated with a cost bFeakout (see
Appendix B). The staffing requirement of 6425 man-years per year for both
vehicle operations and maintenance has been costed at $40 per man-hour and
this is a very reasonable estimate which covers both direct labor as well as
indirect labor and materials. This implicit costing method will be discussed
later in the context of overall staffing requirements.
The vehicles proposed for the Reference System are relatively labor
intensive for what might be expected in the time after the turn of the
century. The possibilities of labor reduction through development and design
of components and systems with much longer use life than is currently
envisioned is clearly indicated. Since the detailed designs for both the
Reference System vehicle components and service facilities are not available,
the area of service Fequirements is _nn_idered to be very uncertain. We rate
this, subjectively, at ±25 percent (1 standard deviation). This is to be
interpreted as agreement with the Boeing/JSC estimate, while asserting that a
great deal of design and planning remain to be accomplished in this area.
In examining the related SPS documentation, we find that there is
concern that Kennedy Space Center may not be large enough to support the
volume of transportation required. It also appears that an equatorial or
other launch site would require an additional $2 to $6 billion dollars
depending upon whether it were located on land or on an offshore platform.
These estimates do not include specialized equipment.
The need for an additional site may be required or desired to provide
internationalization of the SPS. The technical need, however, is considered
3-22 "
slight because the gross volume of the SPS compares with the freight volume
through a major airport such as Los Angeles. A rate of approximately 400-500
tons per day is relatively small for any major trucking firm. Other supplies
to operate the launch site and generate the launching fuel will probably
require revitalized rail or other ground transport, but are not expected to be
quantitatively different from rapid growth of one moderately sized city to a
medium-sized city.
The use of the EOTV for transport from LEO to GEO is also expected to
reduce the advantage of an equatorial site in terms of cost of transporting
mass to GEO. The high Isp of electrical propulsion permits the plane change
from 28 degrees to the equator from KSC with relatively low fuel costs and the
rotational velocity of the Earth in assisting the vehicle is less than a seven
percent advantage in terms of payload to LEO. Thus, while the additional cost
of an equatorial site would be eventually recaptured, there is no great
technical advantage. The equatorial site would also represent a "front-end"
cost.
If an additional launch site is required, it could also be located in
south Texas in a relatively unpopulated area and have approximately the same
advantages and disadvantages as KSC. The vehicles would leave the lower
atmosphere before crossing land and the latitudes in south Texas are the same
or less than at KSC.
3.7 Staffin 9 and Production Implications
The only explicit staffing estimate available is for the vehicle
operations and maintenance facilities at KSC. The approximately 6425 man-
years per year is considered to be reasonable for the direct labor required
for the launch vehicles and the $40 per hour used to estimate the cost
reflects aerospace overhead and materials requirements in 1977. Because of
the WBS definition of transportation, there is concern that indirect require-
ments and their costs have not been captured. Since there is no plan or model
of the manpower requirements--the labor hours and resultant costs have been
estimated parametrically--it is possible to judge the staffing requirements
only in a very gross sense.
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Specifically: The transportation cost per SPS is $2.8 billion with
two SPSs per year. At $40 per hour for direct staff (and which includes
materials and indirect staff and overhead), the direct staff estimate is:
2 SPSs @ $2.8 x 109. (Transport Cost) = 67,307 man-years
$40/hour x 2'080 hours/work year
For transport at $12.5 billion per SPS, the total staffing is:
2 x $12.5 x 109 (Total Cost) = 300,480 man-years
$40/hour: 2080 hours/work year
The implicit transportation staff is 67,000 out of a total of 300,000 SPS
staff, or 22 percent, and this estimate applies to the vehicles only.
For comparison, the air carriers (airlines) employed 292,300 people
in 1975 with revenues of $14.9 billion and the aircraft industry employment
was 514,000 with revenues of $29.5 billion.* The average of revenues per
employee was $26/hour (1975) and when this is adjusted for inflation to 1977
by the consumer price index, this becomes $30/hour. This is compared to
$40/hour used as an aerospace/R&D equivalent for the SPS in 1977 dollars.
The 33 percent difference between $30 and $40 causes some question as
to the appropriateness of the $40/hour estimate for the SPS and the SPS vehi-
cles. This concern is reduced, however, by noting that the SPS is, by its
design and construction methods, a capital and materials intensive project.
"-_"°+'_°_ hol_eved to be the h_st analoov forThe aircraft and air trans_rt I,._ ..... , ........ ..
the SPS transportation system, have low relative labor intensity. For exam-
ple, the equivalent electrical power company figures for 1975 are: Employ-
ment, 314,000; Revenues $46.9 billion; and $72 per employee-hour.
Thus, the imputed staffing for the SPS transport system is viewed as
appropriate. No further judgement of the adequacy of the estimate can be made
at this time because the detailed planning has not been done, nor should it be
intensively pursued until Space Shuttle actual results are available.
* Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1977.
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3.8 Fleet Requirements, Production Implications and
Space Construction & Servicin 9
The fleet requirements for the Reference Program appear adequate
under the assumption made: that the vehicles have 100 percent reliability. We
consider this assumption to be unrealistic and recommend reserves of 10 per-
cent or at least one additional vehicle in an analogy to airline operations.
Typical airline reserve allowances range from one extra vehicle for ten to
fifteen scheduled vehicles. The existence of this reserve permits a delay
rate of approximately five percent of flights and cancellation rate of
approximately one percent of flights. Detailed specifications of the impact
of this allowance on initial fleet procurements is made in Section 1.3.8. It
is expected that as the SPS program progresses, this type of reserve allowance
will be made on the basis of detailed risk assessment studies and the number
of vehicles will be adjusted.
The additional vehicles, as well as the proposed initial fleet,
should present no overall production problems if the assumptions made in the
implicit SPS technological forecast are reasonable. These assumptions are
reasonable projections of capabilities fifteen to twenty years in the future
J
and are supported by reasonable estimates of the research and development
money needed to achieve those capabilities., The major area of concern is the
space structures. In contrast to areas such as photovoltaic cells and launch
vehicles, very little work has been accomplished in this area and the
uncertainties are very high.
The lack of experience in space structures also applies to a lesser
degree to space operations. The ability to conduct operations with little or
no pre-planning to meet unexpected events has only one successful experience:
the repair of the Skylab orbital station after a solar cell panel was ripped
off during launch. This success, however, is an indication that unanticipated
problems can be overcome.
The problems and costs of orbital operations are not part of the
Transportation Work Breakdown Structure because they also support orbital
operations. Because the level of effort devoted to orbital operations has not
been as great as for the vehicles, we are unable to comment on these plans or
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to discuss the uncertainty of these costs. Items not covered in the
Transportation WBS, but which directly impact vehicle operations and costs
are:
(1) Construction/and repair facilities for the EOTV at LEO
(2) Repair facilities for chemical vehicles at LEO and GEO
(3) Fuel storage and transfer facilities at LEO and GEO
(4) Parts and mechanics at LEO and GEO.
Future studies should allocate a reasonable portion of these to the trans-
portation system so that misjudgements as to true costs are not made. One
example is the transportation cost of one man-year of labor at GEO. The
individuals will be rotated so that one person will be in space for only three
months so that for every job four tmips will have to be made. If the PLV/POTV
vehicles are used, and the costs of shipping fuel to LEO and GEO are allocated
to these trips, the current transport cost for one man-year is $1.2 million
without considering other requirements the individual will need. The amount
should be increased by the allocation for orbital facilities costs for support
of these flights and then used in automation trade-off studies. This
relatively high transport cost is one of the reasons we recommend adapting a
personnel module to the HLLV. If the HLLV is used in place of the PLV, the
transportation cost of a man-year is reduced, under similar calculations, to
$780 thousand per man-year.
APPENDIXA
SPSCONCEPTANDREFERENCESYSTEMDESCRIPTION
SOURCE:Argonne National Laboratories
THE SATELLITE POWER SYSTEM CONCEPT
AND CURRENT REFERENCE SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
A.I BACKGROUND
In the current Satellite Power System (SPS) concept, there would be
a number of solar satellites in geosynchronous orbit. Each satellite would
collect solar energy and convert it to an appropriate form for transmission to
a receiving station on earth, where it would be converted to electricity for
delivery to utility networks.
This concept was first proposed in 1968. In the period 1971 to 1977,
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) investigated the basic
thechnlcal feasibility of the concept, studied energy transmission and reception,
and conducted technical assessments at the Johnson and Marshall Space Centers.
In 1976, onerall responsibility for the concept was given to the Energy and
Development Administration (ERDA), and an ERDA task force report recommended an
evaluation study. These activities led to the establishment of a SPS Concept
Development and Evaluation Program (CDEP) to be conducted by the Department of
Energy (DOE) and NASA. This program started in 1977 and is to end in 1980.
The objective of the CDEP was to develop an initial understanding of
the technical feasibility, economic practicality, and the social and environ-
mental acceptability of the SPS concept. CDEP results include: (I) statements
of what is known and what is uncertain with respect to the SPS concept and (2)
future program recommendations.
A.2 SPS POTENTIAL BENEFITS
If ongoing SPS explorations were to point the way to a system that
was technically feasible, economically competitive, and enviro.-__en_a!!y and
socially acceptable, the benefits would be enormous.
• The SPS would be deployed in the years 2000-2050, a
time when the world will need to rely more and more on
renewable or inexhaustible energy resources.
• The SPS is the only solar energy system that would not
need large energy storage systems to provide baseload
power.
• The SPS would have minimal environmental impact. In
particular, SPS energy conversion processes would not
produce C02, and waste heat would be radiated into
space. Minimum weather and climatic effects are an-
ticipated.
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• The problems associated with fuel conversion technologies
(mining, transportation, residuals disposal, etc.) are
completely avoided.
• Available O.$. space technology and capability could be
applied to meet a national need, and U.S. competence in
space would continue to grow.
A.3 SPS CONCEPT
The SPS is a concept to provide baseload electric power and has the
following essential elements: (I) a solar collector in geosynchronous earth
Orbit (GEO), (2) a conversion and transmission system for transferring energy
to earth, and (3) a receiver for gathering the transmitted energy and inter-
facing with electric utility delivery networks. These elements are illus-
trated in Fig. A.1.
The solar collector would be located in space, some 35,800 km above
the earth in a geosynchronous, equatorial orbit. Therefore, the satellite
would remain in continuous, line-of-sight contact with its receiver on earth.
In this orbit, the satellite would be illuminated by sunlight over 99% of
the time. In order to deliver 5,000 MWe, an individual satellite would have
to have an area of approximately 50 km 2.
A variety of energy conversion systems have been proposed and studied.
Silicon cell and gallium aluminum arsen_de cell photovoltaic systems have
received the most attention. Other energy conversion systems have also been
considered, including thermal cycle heat engines (e.g., Itankine, Brayton). In
the heat engine concept, large solar reflectors concentrate the sunlight on a
boiler surface, thus heating a working fluid that is used to drive turbine
generators.
The electricity produced at the satellite could be converted to
microwave energy and formed into a narrow beam precisely aimed at the ground
receiver. Power transmission by laser light could be an attractive alterna-
tive, with the advantage of significantly reduced land use requirements.
If microwaves were used to transmit the power, the ground receiver
would be a large receiving and rectifying antenna (rectenna), which would
reconvert the energy into electricity for baseload utility service. If
laser light were used, the ground-based receiver might be a heat engine.
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The current concept anticipates construction of 50-100 satellites
with a total power output in the range of 250-500 GWe. Construction in
space of SPS structures would be a formidable task and would require protec-
tion of the work force and some materials from hard vacuum, intense sunlight,
and natural radiation fields. Construction would have to be highly automated
and could take place primarily at low earth orbit (LEO) or GEO. The use of
materials derived from the moon for SPS construction has also been considered.
In summary, a number of SPS configurations and energy conversion
approaches have been explored. The completed studies have been invaluable in
helping to flesh out the SPS concept and in identifying the technical, en-
vironmental, societal, and economic issues.
A.4 SYSTEM DEFINITION
The SPS will require no scientific breakthroughs. However, it is
recognized as a difficult engineering development project requiring substan-
tial technological advances in many areas. Success will depend on: (I)
reductions in the cost of space transportation, (2) improvements in energy
conversion technology (including decreases in unit weight and cost and
increases in efficiency), (3) advances in space structures, construction, and
operations technology, and (4) improved satellite-to-earth energy transmission
characteristics.
Numerous configurations involving various thermodyn_nic and photo-
voltaic techniques for converting solar energy to electrical energy have
been studied. Other investigations have considered structures and materials,
transportation approaches and systems, microwave energy transmission, assembly
techniques, and other aspects of the SPS system. Based on these studies, a
SPS reference system was defined to serve as the basis forconductin_
environmental, societal, and comparative assessments; alternative concept
tradeoff studies; and supporting critical investigations. However, it must be
emphasized that this reference system is not necessarily the optimum or even
the preferred system. It does represent one plausible approach for achieving
SPS goals.
The reference system configuration is illustrated in Fig. A.2, and the
main characteristics are summarized in Table A.3. This configuration would
provide 5 GW of electric power at the commercial grid interface. Sixty units
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would be placed in geosyuchronous orbit and provide 300 GW of power. Approx-
imately six months would be required tQ construct each satellite system.
Of the energy conversion approaches studied, two photovoltaic options
were considered for the reference design. In one option, silicon (Si) cells
were used, with a basic cell efficiency of 17.3%. In the other option,
gallium aluminum arsenide (GaAiAs) cells, with a basic cell efficiency of 20%,
and concentrators for focusing the solar energy on the cells were used.
Although Si technology is more advanced than GaAIAs technology, the GaAIAs
option has the potential for providing a lighter-weight system and, by the use
of concentrators, it offers the promise of self-annealing of radiation damage
occurring in the cells.
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Table A.3 October 1978 Reference System Characteristics
System Characteristics
Generation Capability (Utility Interface):
300 Gigawatts - Total
5 Gigawatts - Single Unit
Number of Units: 60
Design Life: 30 Years
Construction Rate:
Construction Time:
2 Units/Year
6 Months/
Satellite
Satellite
Overall Dimensions:
Structural Material:
10x5xO.5 km
Graphite Composite
Satellite Mass: 35-50xi06 kg
Geosynchronous Orbit: 35,800 km
Energy Conversion System
Photovoltaic Solar Cells: Silicon or Gallium Aluminum Arsenide
Power Transmission and Reception
DC-RF Conversion: Klystron (105 Tubes)
Transmitting Antenna Diameter: 1 km
Frequency: 2.45 Gigahertz
Power Density at Rectenna Edge: 1 mW/cm 2
Rectenna Dimensions: %10x13 km
Rectenna Exclusion Dimensions:
%11.5x14.5 km
Peak Power Density: 23 mW/cm 2
Power Density at Exclusion Edge:
0.i mW/cm 2
Space Transportation System
Earth-to-LEO - Cargo: Vertical Takeoff, Winged 2-Stage (425 metric ton
payload)
- Personnel: Modified Shuttle
LEO-EQ-GEO - Cargo: Electric Orbits! Transfer Vehicle
- Personnel: _ao-Stage Liquid 0xygen/Liquid Hydrogen
Space Construction
Construction Staging Base - LEO: %480 km
Final Construction - GE0: %35,800 km
Construction Crew: %600
The energy collected and converted to electricity aboard the satellite
must be transmitted to the microwave power transmission system at high vol-
tages (%40 kV). The transmission system provides for the conversion of
DC power to microwave power and for its transfer to earth at a frequency
of 2.45 GHz. Maximum power density at the center of the beam would be 23
mW/cm 2, while at the edge of the ground receiving antenna (rectenna) and at
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the exclusion distance, the power density would be only 1 mW/cm 2 and 0.I
mW/cm 2 respectively.
The recCenna design is a series of serrated panels perpendicular to the
incident bemn. Each panel has a steel mesh ground plane with 75-80% optical
transparency.
Development of the SPS will require a new space transportation system.
For economic reasons, the system must be designed for reuse. A heavy lift
launch vehicle capable of single-mission delivery of about 425 metric tons of
material and equipment and a personnel launch vehicle for the transportation
of personnel and priority cargo between earth and the LEO staging base would
be required. In addition, transfer of cargo and personnel from the LEO
staging base to the construction base at GEO would require a personnel
orbital transfer vehicle and an electric cargo transfer vehicle.
In addition Co the reference system, emerging technologies and concepts
Chat could have a beneficial impact on SPS development require further evalua-
tion. For example, a thorough investigation of the use of a solid-state
microwave system is warranted, since it has the potential for high reli-
ability, lower cost, and optim,-- lower unit power output. Also, some problems
associated with microwave energy transmission could be avoided by using
lasers. Potential benefits of this system include smaller land requirements,
elimination of microwave frequency interference, and reduced biological and
ecological impacts.
APPENDIX B
SPS TRANSPORTATION COST ESTIMATES
SOURCE: JOHNSON SPACE CENTER
Mr. Richard Earhart
B44-?9-21Z NOV 1.4 1979
TO" NASA Headquarters
Attn: RES-1/H, D, Calahan
EM/Assoctat_ Director for Program Developoent
SPS Transportation System Cost Estimates
JSC is In the process of preparing a cost data book detailing the
estimated cost of each mJor SPS subsystem. The cost estimates, based
on the SPS Reference System, are collected by work breakdown structure
ele_nt, and the support Information used In the preparation of the
estimate ts included with each estimate,
The space transportation system sectSon of this data book is now
Virtually co_olete. The data from thts section, along with some ex-
• .4.p.sn.cory mate_al ts enclosed for your review and comment. Specifi-
cally, the following are Included.
1, A definition of _he cost categories used.
Z, An explanation of the cost estimating methodology used.
$, Learntng curves.
4t An SPS |mpl_entatlon scenartc description.
S, A vehicle tnfor=atton package
- vehicle definition
- veh|cle design description
- vehtcle ross statement
-detatled vehicle cost estimate
- vehtcle cost per fl|ght calculation
$, A transportation cost summary.
The tnfomation presented on the transportation system Is stmtlar to
the Infomation presented to Untted Engineers for their evaluation of
the ground systems.
Original Signed By
Robert O. Piland
Robert O. Plland
Inclosure
bcc:
Argone Nat. Labs/M. Samsa
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DEFINITION OF COST CATEGORIES
DDT&E Costs: The design, development, test, and evaluation account
includes all costs associated with the engineering and support required to
translate the SPS performance specification into a detail_d design. It
includes the preparation of detailed drawings $or hardware fabrication,
assembly and system integration. Also included are all required te)ts,
both ground and flight, together with any test facilities required. Also
included are the costs related to test evaluation, data reduction and design
modification. Specifically not included in the DDT&E costs are the costs
associated with the construction of production facilities and the launch and
recovery facilities associated with the SPS transportation system. These
costs are separately accounted so that they may be amortized over the SPS
implementation scenario.
TFU: The theoretical first unit costs are those costs associated with
the production of the first identifiable SPS element or subsystem produced
by the full-scale production processes. It is a useful point of departure
for the application of learning technique to determine average unit
production costs. It includes costs after the completion of the DDT&E
phase, but before the initial operation of the first SPS.
Average Unit Cost: The average unit cost is the cost associated with
the production of a typical SPS system, subsystem or element. It is
essentially the average cost of the unit produced to comply with the imple-
mentation scenario. It includes all quality assurance costs, manufacturing
costs, production test costs, etc., associated with an on-going program.
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COSTESTIMATINGMETHODOLOGY
J
Virtually all the DDT&E and TFU transportation system costs were estimated
using the Boeing developed Parametric Cost Model (PCM) computer program.
This program requires both factual and judg_mental input information.
Factual input data includes subsystem descr|ptors such as the nature of
the subsystem, its mass, volume, performance characteristics, etc.
Judgemental input data includes the estimators opinion of the subsystem
complexity and the degree to which it represents a new design vs. an
off-the-shelf design.
The PCM program then computes both an estimate of both the DDT&E and TFU
cost from a data bank of historical aircraft and aerospace parametric
cost data. The PCM estimate of the TFU vehicle cost along with the
number of vehicles to be produced to meet the requirements of the imple-
mentation scenario is used with the learning curve to obtain an estimate
of the average unit cost.
Aircraft industry experience indicates that a learning curve factor of
_=0o85 is applicable at the vehicle level. Experience with jet aircraft
production indicates that this relationship holds true to the lOOOth
unit and beyond. Average unit costs were estimated at the vehicle level
only and not at the subsystem level.
All costs were computed in 1977 dollars. To adjust the estimates to
current year dollars (1979), multiply by 1.15. Launch facility costs
are estimated as part of the ground systems cost and are not included
in the transportation costs.
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!mplement_tion Scenario Many of the costs of SPS elements are strong
functions of the quantity produced or, as in the case of the transportation
systems, the flight frequency. This scenario describes a total program of
32-1/2 years duration from first launch to the completion of the 60th 5 GW
reference SPS. The following assumptions were made in the derivation of this
scenario:
m An initial two year period for the assembly of construction base in
both low earth orbit (LEO) and geosynchronous orbit (GEO) and the fabrication
of the Electric Orbital Transfer Vehicle (EOTV) fleet. Six months are devoted
to the LEO construction base, l-I/2 years to the fabrication of the EOTV fleet
and completion of the GEO base at the end of the second year.
• The first SPS requires 12 months construction time and is completed at
the end of the third year of the scenario.
• 59 subsequent SPS's are completed at the rate of one every six months.
• In space, crews are changed every 90 days.
The transportation requirements for the scenario were deri:ved in the follow-
ing manner. First, the weight and number of personnel required for each major
item of equipment or function requiring space transportation were identified.
Next, the characteristics of each of the space transportation vehicles: The
Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle (HLLV), the Personnel Launch Vehicle (PLV), the Electric
Orbital Transfer Vehicle (EOTV), and the Personnel Orbital Transfer Vehicle (POTV)
were identified. Finally, a program scenario summary lists the number of flights
per year made by each type of vehicle, the number of each type of vehicle required
and when replacement vehicles are needed.
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PAYLOAD CHARAC'I'ER I STI CS
(All Weights in Metric Tons)
SPS
Satellite (1)
Allowance for Breakage (2%)
Total per Satellite
LEOBASE
Base
Crew Facilities Supplies/Yr
Work Facilities Supplies/Yr
GEOBASE
Base
Crew Facilities Supplies/Yr
Work Facilities Supplies/Yr
EOTV
Vehicle
PropeIian t/Flight
Refurbish ment/Fiight
POTV- CREWROTATION/SUPPLY
Stage
Propellant/Flight (Up/Dn)
Refurbishment/Flight
Personnel Module
SPS MAINTENANCE
SPS Supplies/Satellite/Yr
Crew & Work Facilities/20 Satellites
Crew & Work SupplieslYr/20 Satellites
POTVMaintenance Sortie ProplSateilite/Yr
50,984
1,020
52,004
I, 603
313
72
4800
568
683
1,462
515
40
14
2001185
0.1
53
236
1154
206
25
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WBS 1.3.1 HEAVY LIFT LAUNCH VEHICLE
Definition - The Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle (HLLV) is a vehicle used to trans-
port all SPS hardware construction, maintenance and supop_ low
earth orbit. _ equipment to /'
T '"
CH4IO 2 C. . S" (16J
--- • *' • ° °
. . . "-. 4
J 0;';.£3IT E R " " j
_D.6 rn _ ]E;DDS'IER 73.B m
= (2r,,4 h) >j_- (2_:2 hJ "
Design Description
The HLLV is a two-staged winged, fully reusable vehicle. The series
burn concept uses 16 LCH4/LO 2 on the booster stage and 14 SSME's on the
Orbiter. The booster engines employ a gas generator cycle to generat_ a
vacuum thrust of 9.8 x.lO 6 newtons each. The SSME's provide 2.1 x IOb
newtons each. An RPl/air propulsion system has been provided on the booster
for flyback capability to simplify the operational mode. Heat sink thermal
protection is used for the booster and the Shuttle reusable surface insulation
is used on the Orbiter. The HLLV has a gross payload of 424 MT and a net
payload of 374 MT. The vehicle has an inert weight of 1413 MT and has an
estimated life of 300 missions. Propellant requirements are 1709 MT LCH4;
329 MT LH2, 7103 MT LO2 and 85 MT RPI per fli ht. Turnaround time is
estimated to be 97 hours for the booster and _27 hours for the Orbiter. A
more detailed vehicle description can be found in DD-25037-3, pp. Z55-267 and
272-277.
B-17
Boosxef MatJ Statcrnen!
_.. OTHER
AUXILIARY_ 4_ __ .
AUXILIARY SYSTEMS ENVIROPh_ENTAL
4_ PROTECTION
6_
DRY MASS BREAKDOWN
STRUCTURE )GO IIDB
INDUCED ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 46 400
LAJ_DING AND AUXILIARY rYI;TEMI; 34 rmo0
ASCENT PROPULSION 204 600
AUXILIARY PROPULSION 60 600
PRIME POWER 4 300
ELECTrlICAL CONVERSION AND DISTRIBUTION 4 200
HYDRAULIC CONVEIrI,_ION AND DISTRIDUTION 10 900
SURFACE CONTROLS 10 300
AVIONICS 11r,,,oo
Et,fvIr_ONMENTAL CONTROL 200
GROWTH B8 600
DRY MASS - 2g6 BOO
RESIDUALS AND RESERVES 49 800
LANDING MASS " 848 700
LOSSES DURING FLYBACK. BE 200
START FLYBACK MASS -, 932 900
ENTRY IN-FLIGHT LOSSES 3 700
&'TART ENTRY MA.T,S " 936 600
IN-FLIGIIT LOSSES PRIOR TO ENTRY 27 000
STAGING MASS - 9G3 600
THRUST DECAY PROPELLANT 14 S00
INERT MASS - B78 lOO
Orbiter Mass Statement
PROt'ULSI 0N j_
16%
AUX SYSTEMS
4E
STRUCTURE
_--- INDUCED
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
13_
STRUCTURE 1L"29O0
,INDucED ENVIRONh:ENTAL PROTECTION 48 300
lANDING AND AUX SYSTEMS 15 BOO
ASCENT PROPULSION 60 800
AUXILIARY PROPULSION II BOO
PRIME POWER 2 S00
ELECTRICAL CONVEP, SiO_ A_;D O:._'T.RIPUT!O.M. 4 BOO
HYDRAULIC CONVERSION AND DISTRIBUTION 3 SO0
SURFACE CONTROLS 6 800
AVIONICS 2 400
ECI.._S AND PERSONI_EL PROV 2 B00
G RO_'FI'H 32 900
DRY MASS - 373 2O0
PERSJDNI'JEL AND PAYLOAD ACCOh'MODATIO,'JS 4 100
RESIDUAL A]_ID RESERVF_ 14 800
LANDING MASS - 3.91 B00
ENTRY IrJ-FLIGHT LOSSES 3 400
START ENTRY MASS - 395 200
IN-FLIGHT LOSSES PRIOR TO ENTRY 31; _00
INERT MASS - 435 100
DRY MA3S BREAKDOWN
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_NO.
1.3
1.3.1
1.3.1.1
1.3.1.2
1.3.1.2.1
1.3.1.2.2
1.3.1.2.3
1.3.1.2.4
1.3.1.2.5
1.3.1.2.5
1.3.1.2.7
1.3.1.2.8
1.3.1.2.9
1.3.1.2.10
1.3.1.2.11
1.3.1.2.12
1.3.1.2.13
1.3.1.2.14
iv
1.3.1.3
1.3.1.3.1
1.3.1.3.2
1.3.1.3.3
1.3.1.3.4
1.3.1.3.5
1.3.1.3.6
1.3.1.3.7
1.3.1.3.8
1.3.1.3.9
1.3.1.3.10
1.3.1.3.11
1.3.1.3.12
1.3.1.3.13
1.3.1.3.14
WBS ELEMENT
SPACE TRANSPORTATION
CARGO LAUNCH VEHICLE
VEHICLE
BOOSTER STAGE
STRUCTURES
INDUCED ENVIRON. PROTEC.
LANDING & AUXILIARY SYST.
ASSENT PROPULSION
FLYBACK PROPULSION
OTHERBOOSTER SYSTEMS
BOOSTER SYSTEMS TEST
BOOSTER GSE
TOOLING
SOFTWARE
PROG. INT. & MGT.
GSE SUBSYSTEMS
ASSEMBLY ArIDCHECKOUT
BOOSTER SE&I
ORBITER STAGE
STRUCTURES
INDUCED ENVIRON. PROTEC.
LANDING & AUX. SYSTEMS
ASSENT PROPULSION
AUXILIARY PROPULSION
OTHER ORBITER SYSTEMS
WBS ELEMENT
ORBITER GBS
TOOLING
SOFTWARE
PROG. INT. & MGT.
GSE SUBSYSTEMS
ASSEMBLY & CHECKOUT
SE&I
DDT&E
11,202
6,528
550
15
193
803
235
156
3,294
315
397
27
162
306
75
4,674
325
164
92
41
280
212
2,569
258
273
24
133
237
65
TFU
1,748
984
169
6
110
199
107
134
0
153
0
0
44
0
61
764
104
65
56
182
24
137
D
119
33
m
46
m
AVU
.595
335
260
0&(
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HLLV - COST PER FLIGHT
HARDWARE:
$595MPERVEHICLE
300 FLIGHTS PER VEHICLE
$1,9BOK
PROPELLANT:
H2 346 TONNES @ $1.53/kg
02 7,458 TONNES @ $.037/kg
RPI 1,794 TONNES @ $.37/kg
CH 4 87 TONNES @ $.21/kg
REPLENISHMENT AND REFURBISHMENT
STAGE l
ASSENT ENGINES
AIRBREATHING ENGINES
ALL OTHER
STAGE 2
ASSENT ENGINES
MANEUVERINGENGINES
ALL OTHER
GROUND OPERATIONS
TOOLING
MANPOWER
TOTAL COST PER FLIGHT ..........
" 530K
= 276K
= 700K
= 18K
$I,002K
6K
870K
930K
6K
780K
628K
235K
2,138K
$10.1M
B-20
WBS I_3.2 CARGO ORBIT TRANSFER VEHICLE
Definition - The cargo orbit transfer vehicle is used to transport
satellite components, maintenance hardware, andselected crew and
base support supplies fromLEO to GEO. This vehicle u_es electric
propulsion and is called the electric orbit transfer vehicle (EOTV).
PAYLOAD AND
PROPELLANT
I;OLARARRAY
Design Description
The EOTV configuration for cargo transportation is shown above. The
vehicle is sized to deliver 4,000 MT to GEO and return 200 MT from GEO,
with an uptrip time of 180 days and a downtrip time of 40 days. Propulsion
is provided by I156-120 cm ion diameter thrusters with an Isp of 8000
seconds. The thrusters use an argon propellant and are powered by a
l km x 1.5 km silicon solar collector. Solid-state power processors are
used to compensate for wide swings in power and voltage caused by accultation,
radiation damage, and thermal effects. The vehicle is designed for lO round-
trip flights and the payload size was chosen to be compatible with lO HLLV
flights. Additional detail may be found in D180-25037-3, pages 278-293.
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EOTV MASS STATEMENT
I_ Power I
_Generation • __ . /
_48% )lr:;utT:Con/
Item .Mass k9.
Solar Array - Silicon 780,000
Structure 122,000
Power Distribution 42,000
Energy Storage 7,000
Power Generation & Distribution Subtotal 951,000
Thrusters
Power Conditioning
Thermal Control
Structures and Mechanisms
Propellant Feed
79,000
219,000
88,000
61,000
49,000
Electric Propulsion Subtotal 496,000
Auxiliary Systems Subtotal 15,000
Total Dry Weight 1,462,000
Propellant
Argon
Hydrogen
Oxygen
469,000
6,600
39,400
Payload (Gross)
Total Start Burn Mass
4,OO0,O00
5,977,000
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k_S NO.
1.3.2
1.3.2.1
1.3.2.2
1.3.2.3
1.3.2.4
1.3.2.5
1.3.2.6
1.3.2.7
1.3.2.8
1.3.2.9
1.3.2.10
1.3.2.11
1.3.2.12
WBS ELEMENT
CARGOORBITER TRANSFER
VEHICLF (OTV)
POWERGENERATIONSYST_4
POWERCOLLECTION& DIST.
ELECTRICPROPULSIONSYST.
AVIONICS
TOOLING
SYSTEMS TEST
SE&I
SOFTWARE
GSE
PROG. INT. & MGT.
ASSEMBLY & CHECKOUT
SUSTAINING ENGINEERING
DDT&E
2,247
.4
10.5
89.1
19.9
858.5
1,164.1
12
18.3
23.1
51.3
TFU
2,126
917
7
777
14
o
228
75
g6
12
AVU
283.5
O&E
t
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EOTV - PER FLIGHT COST
HARDWARE:
AVERAGE VEHICLECOST
FLIGHTS PER VEHICLE
i
283,600K
"10
• $2B,400K
PROPELLANT:
ARGON 494 TONNES @ $1/kg
0z 37.8 TONNES @ $.037/kg
H2 9.5 TONNES @ $I.53/kg
REFURBISHMENT:
PROGRAM SUPPORT
TOTAL COST PER FLIGHT .................
$494K
IK
14K
ll,300K
500K
$40,709K
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l_,S 1.3.3 PERSONNELLAUNCHVEHICLE (PLV)
Definition - The PLV is a vehicle used to transport personnel and priority
cargo to LEO.
37.93 m : 55.69 m .
Design Description
The PLV is a drivitive of the space shuttle system. The vehicle consists
of a winged liquid propellant flyback booster that uses four 02/CH4 engines
similar to the HLLV booster engines, a smaller version of the shuttle tank and
the space _huttle orbiter. The payload to LEO is 89 MT, compatible with the
80 m_n pay.loadof the POTV. The vehicle has a design life of 200 flights. The
choice of the space shuttle orbiter as part of the PLV minimizes the DDT&E costs
and permits the average unit cost to be based on a known cost rather than an esti-
mate.
L !
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FLYBACKBOOSTERMASS SUMMARY
Other 4%
Growth 7%
_Structure _ Assent prop V
\_ _nvi/ronmental 4%
Landing Syst. 5%
Item KG
Wlng 31,940
Tall 4,930
Body 68,490
Induced Environ. Protection 9,050
Landing and Aux. Systems 9,730
Propulsion - Ascent 51,320
Propulsion - RCS 960
Propulsion - Flyback 13,800
Prime Power 1,190
Elec. Conv. and Distribution 960
Hj_I.Cony. and Distribution 4,230
Surface Controls 2,020
Avionics 1,450
Environmental Control 210
Growth Allowance 16,200
Dry Mass (216,460)
Residuals and Reserves 12,700
Landing Mass (229,160)
Flyback Fuel 26,260
Inflight Losses 3,900
Inert Mass (259,320)
ET MASS SUMMARY
Element KG
Structures 21,146
Thermal Protection 1,631
Propulsion & Mech. System 1,710
Electrical System 66
ORBAttachments 1,492
Change Uncertainty 686
ET Inert Mass 26,731
Unusables 1,530
ET Meco Mass 28,261
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WSS NO.
1.3.3
1.3.3.1
1.3.3.1.1
1.3.3.1.2
1.3.3.1.3
1.3.3.1.4
1.3.3.1 .S
1.3.3.1.6
1.3.3.1.7
1.3.3.2
1.3.3.2.1
1.3.3.2.2
1.3.3.2.3
1.3.3.2.4
1.3.3.2.5
1.3.3.2.6
IS ELEMENT
PERSONNELLAUNCHVEHICLE
BOOSTERSTAGE
STRUCTURES
INDUCEDENVIRON. PROTEC.
LANDING& AUX. SYSTEMS
ASSENT PROPULSION
FLYBACKPROPULSION
OTHERBOOSTERSYSTEMS
PROGRAMINT. & MGT.
ORBITER STAGE
STRUCTURES
INDUCEDENVIRON. PROTECT.
LANDING& AUX. SYSTEMS
ASSENTPROPULSION
OHS PROPULSION
OTHERORBITER SYSTEMS
DDT&E
2,616
2,616
o
m
4m
w.
60
77
TFU
790
240.
4e
4.
ee
,m
,m
15
18
SSO
AYU O&E
673
123
550
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PLV : COST PER FLIGHT
HARDWARE: $670_ OOOK/VEHICLE
200 FLIGHTS/VEHICLE
EXPENDABLE TANK
PROPELLANT:
02 1685 TONNES @ $.037/kg
CH 4 432 TONNES @ $.39/kg
H2 82 TONNES @ $I.53/kg
REFURBISHMENT AND REPLENISHMENT:
$3,350K
3,200K
62K
169K
125K
263K
GROUND OPERATIONS
TOOLING
MANPOWER
PROGRAM SUPPORT
517K
ll6K
2,30DK
623K
TOTAL COST PER FLIGHT ...... $I0.7M
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WBS 1.3.4 PERSONNEL ORBITAL TRANSFER VEHICLE (POTV)
The Personnel Orbital Transfer Vehicle is a space transportation system
designed to transport crews, priority crew supplies, and priority cargo from
LEO to GEO. The POTV is also used to transfer crews from the GEO base to an
SPS for maintenance.
43m -_
L
20m ,r
_ rql ;_r_ f r,,t
lit a \ \
I 1
',. ,_..,'i
\POTV
23m
•- !m_-i
 oooo 
_ "'Orbital Personnel
Module
(80 passengers)
Design Desoription
The POTV is a single stage LO2/LH 2 propelled vehicle which has the
capability of transporting 90 MT of payload from LEO to GEO with a turn-
around time of 5 days. This includes transit time, refueling time, and
crew rotation time. The payload is sufficient to deliver 80 GEO workmen
and crew supplies for 6,600 man-days. The vehicle has a design life of
50 round-trip flights. Refueling is accomplished at GEO with propellant
delivered by the EOTV. Five 88 KN thrust staged combustion engines are
used for main propulsion. These engines have an Isp of 470 seconds. Auxil-
iary engines with an Isp of 375 seconds are used for attitude control and
for low delta-V maneuvers and docking. Electric power is provided by
space shuttle-type fuel cells.
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POTVMASS STATEMENT
Item
Structure and Mechanisms
Main Propulsion
Auxi]iary Propulsion
Avionics
Electric Power System
Thermal Control
Contingency (l5%)
Mass (kg)
6,900
2,500
500
300
450
l ,030
1,750
13,430
Payload
Total Propellant and Fuel Cell Fuel
90,000
203,000
Total Start Burn Mass 2]6.5 MT
Thermal
-Control 8%
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WBS NO.
1.3.4
1.3.4.1
1.3.4.2
"1.3.4.3
1.3.4.4
1.3.4.5
1.3.4.6
1.3.4.7
1.3.4.8
1.3.4.9
1.3.4.10
1.3.4.11
1.3.4.12
1.3.4.13
1.3.4.14
WBS ELEMENT
PERSONNELOTV
STRUCTURES
PROPULSION
AUXILIARY PROPULSION
ELECTRIC POWER
DDT&E
1,012
39
381
5
15
TFU
100
15
19
6
4
AVU
44
AVIONICS
THERMAL/ENVIRON. CONTROL
ASSEMBLYAND CHECKOUT
SE&I
SOFT_/ARE
GSE
SYSTEMTEST
TOOLING
PROG. INT. & MGT.
OTHER
45 8
23 1
6
22
26
48 21
198
14 7
83 7
112 6
I
O&E
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POTV - COST PER FLIGHT
HARDWARE:
$44_O00K/VEHICLE.
50 FLIGHTS/VEHICLE
$880K
PROPELLANT:
02 17g TONNES@ $.037/kg
H2 32 TONNES@ $1.53/kg
7K
48K
REFURBISHMENT AND REPLENISHHENT
ENGINES
OTHER
68K
3K
TOOLING
GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
MISCELLANEOUS
3K
llK
289K
TOTAL COST PER FLIGHT .......... $1,309K
B-32
GROUND OPERATIONS AND SYSTEM MAINTENANCE
WBS
1.3.7
1.3.7.1
1.3.7.1.1
!.3.7.1.2
1.3.7.2
1.3'3.2.1
1.3.7.2.2
1.3.7.2.3
1.3.7.2.4
1.3.7.2.5
1.3.7.2,6
1.3,7.2.7
1.3.7.2.8
1.3.7.2.9
1.3,7.2,10
1.3.7.3
1,3.7.4
1.3.7.5
FACILITY
Ground Support Facilities
Launch Facilities
HLLV Launch Facilities
PLV Launch Facilities
Recovery Facilities
Landlng Slte
HLLV Orbiter and Payload Processing Facility
HLLV-Booster Processing Facility
Engine Maintenance Facility
Hypergollc Maintenance Facility
Passenger Off loading Facility
PLV Booster Processing Facility
PLV Orbiter Processing Facility
VertlcaI Assembly Building
Mobile Launcher Platform
Fuel Facilities
Logistic Support _"
Operations
TOTAL ANNUAL
MAN-HOURS
OPERATIONS MAINTENANCE
(.S_174,832) (7,676,714)
E:>
476j800 g62,500
79)196 133,616
14_,920 215,_g0
906)400 1,3_9,600
_92)800 739,200
2)2_0 3,360
67)520 101,280
75)6_6 1,134)9_
3_)g40 36,g5_
727)080 g23,4_0
I)314,000 _,971,000
g_l)2g0 292.000
Included In 1.3.7.2.2 and 1.3.7.2.3
Included In 1.3.7.1.2
Total Annual Operations Man-Hours = 2,587 Man-Years
Total Annual Maintenance Man-Hours = 3,g38 Man-Years
HLLV and PLV Man-Hours
each assume a portion of these items
HLLV Related. Man-Hours
HLLV Related Cost
PLV Related Man-Hours
PLV Related Cost
4,710,500
$ 0.188B
464,300
$ 0.018B
6,075,700
$ 0.243B ($40/
MHr
1,601,000
$ 0.064B ($40/
MHI
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TOTAL TRANSPORTATION COST SUMMARY
(millions)
DDT&E
0
0
0
0
Heavy Life Launch Vehicle
Cargo Orbit Transfer Vehicle
Personnel Launch Vehicle
Personnel Orbital Transfer Vehicle
$II,202
2,247
2,616
l,Ol2
Total Transportation DDT&E $17,077
Average Transportation Cost per SPS
o HLLV
o EOTV
o PLV
o POTV
$10.1m/FLT x II,606 FLTS
60 SPS
$40o7m/FLT x 847 FLTS
60
$10o7m/FLT x 1458 FLTS
60 SPS
$1o3m/FLT x 587 FLTS
60 SPS
$1,954m/SPS
575m/SPS
260m/SPS
12.7m/SPS
Total transportation cost per SPS $2,802m/SPS
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